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“It was to keep the peace, not to change the world order,  
that the Security Council was set up”1
 
1
 ICJ Namibia, 1971, page 294, dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice.  
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1 Introduction 
                                                
1.1 Description of the main problem 
 
The Security Council has on two occasions adopted binding resolutions containing norms 
of abstract-general contents: Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, on international 
terrorism, and Resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 on the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Innovative is, that the resolutions defined the phenomena of international 
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as threats to the peace as 
such2, that is, that the resolutions refers not to a particular situation, but to every 
occurrence of the phenomena. Even more innovative is that the resolutions contain 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms, which have no timely or 
geographical limitations. Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are for these reasons both highly 
innovative and equally hotly debated.  
 
The main reason for the debate is that the Security Council through adopting Resolutions 
1373 and 1540 arguably takes on the role of an international legislature, that is: the role 
of adopting binding norms applicable on an indeterminate number of addressees in an 
indeterminate number of cases. Critics have found their main arguments in key notions 
like ‘democracy’, ‘transparency’, ‘legitimacy’ and most importantly ‘legality’; sponsors 
praise the Security Council for adapting quickly to global challenges and for posing an 
 
2
 SC-Res. 1373 of 28 September 2001, preamble paragraph 3: “Reaffirming further that such acts, like any 
act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security”. SC-Res. 1540 of 28 
April 2004, preamble paragraph 1: “Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons (…) constitutes a threat to international peace and security”.  
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efficient alternative to the traditional treaty-making process on the area of public 
international law.  
 
The question, which will be answered in the present paper, is whether or not the Security 
Council was in the possession of the necessary powers to adopt Resolutions 1373 of 2001 
and 1540 of 2004. In other words: were the Resolutions adopted ultra vires or intra vires? 
The question will be attempted answered on a general basis which makes the main 
question of the present paper whether or not the adoption of simultaneously binding, 
abstract and general is coherent with the competencies of the United Nations Security 
Council.  
 
Traditionally, the Security Council has had the role of the “world police”; in which it 
responds to particular situations and makes bindings decisions as far as this is necessary 
to restore international peace and security. As part of this police-role, the Security 
Council may adopt binding resolutions of far-reaching contents. In the past, resolutions 
have been adopted with either abstract or general or binding contents or containing 
norms combining two of these factors. Adopting resolutions containing simultaneously 
binding, abstract and general norms is obviously a great step forward from what has 
previously been understood under this “world police” –role. A competence to adopt 
binding abstract-general norms would dramatically change, or even re-define the role of 
the Security Council, implying disruptions in the balance between the organs of the 
Organization and widespread consequences on the public international law area.   
 
In the adoption of resolutions containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and 
general contents, a great potential is clearly present. Resolutions by the Security Council 
prevail – so Article 103 of the Charter – over any other international treaty. That is: the 
resolutions have great consequences for the Member States, both for treaties made and 
for treaties to come in the future. The ordinary procedures for creating international 
obligations, or “soft law” for states would be disregarded through this one-sided 
procedure of the Security Council.  
 
7 
More than interfering in the international public law sphere, the Resolutions 1373 and 
1540 influence the national legislature. The norms contained in the resolutions are of 
such a character that they may only be properly implemented through inner state 
legislation, that is, if Security Council Resolutions are not automatically part of the 
internal law. If the Member States fail to provide such legislation, this would be non-
compliance with the Resolutions and would, in the worst case, open for sanctions against 
these non-complying states. This need for internal legislation is problematic in relation to 
the sovereign equality of states manifested in the Charter of the United Nations, in 
particular because of the simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents of the 
norms.  
 
As to the use of terminology, the adoption of binding abstract-general resolutions has 
been referred to as ‘true international legislation’ and the role of the Security Council as a 
‘true international legislature’. The use of the notions has been widely discussed in the 
literature. However, aside from the utilization of differing terminology, the core material 
content of these notions is the same: simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms. 
The present writer will for this reason use the notion ‘binding resolutions of abstract-
general contents’ to avoid confusion.3
 
 
1.2 Presentation of Resolutions 1373 and 1540   
 
The unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 of 28th of September 2001 on international 
terrorism contains binding norms, which lie several and far-reaching obligations on the 
Member States. Their main obligation under the Resolutions is to prevent and suppress 
the financing of terrorist acts. This is of course a relative vague obligation, but the 
following paragraphs are of a more concrete character; for example are the Member 
States obliged to criminalize the financing of terrorist acts and to prohibit its nationals 
                                                 
3
 See discussion below in part 2.4.  
8 
from making finances available to terrorists. The states as such shall avoid providing 
active or passive support to terrorist entities. The duties put on the Member States are for 
this reason of a very concrete nature, giving them distinct obligations and implying far-
reaching consequences for both the Member States as such and for any affected 
individuals.  
 
Resolution 1540 on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was 
unanimously adopted on the 28th of April 2004 and contains binding norms putting 
several and far-reaching obligations on the Member States.4 Like Resolution 1373, it puts 
demands on inter-state legislation and has in turn a great effect on any affected 
individuals. The main obligation after Resolution 1540 is for the Member States to refrain 
from providing support to non-state actors, either trying to acquire or attempting to use 
weapons of mass destruction. Such activities shall be prohibited in national law. The 
States shall establish domestic controls, and the resolution establishes several concrete 
obligations on the Member States to ensure this: they shall account for- and secure WMD 
and they shall establish physical protection measures, effective border controls and 
effective national export controls.  
 
Simultaneously to adopting the described simultaneously binding, abstract and general 
norms, the Security Council in Resolutions 1373 and 1540 established two committees 
for monitoring the implementation of the resolutions. These have had an important role 
not only in monitoring, but as well in interpreting the obligations under the Resolutions 
and advising the Member States on how to best implement the Resolutions. In this 
manner, the committees arguably function as administrative organs on the areas of 
counter terrorism and counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  
 
                                                 
4
 The resolution uses the notions “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as 
their means of delivery”. For the sake of simplicity, the present author uses the notion weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) meaning the same.  
9 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are both resolutions containing norms of simultaneously 
binding, abstract and general character. They are applicable to a not particular number of 
situations, are of no timely and geographic limitations and have widespread effect both 
for the national legislation of the Member States as well as for the legal position of any 
affected individuals.  
 
 
1.3 Limitations to the thesis theme 
 
In answering the question on the legality of the Security Council adopting resolutions of 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents, several sub-questions arise. 
However, answering all those would heavily overload the paper capacity and go beyond 
the purposes of the present theme. For this reasons, some limitations must be made.   
 
In the discussions on the latest developments in of the competencies of the Security 
Council, some writers have used the notion ‘true international legislation’ or similar 
notions to describe Resolutions 1373 and 1540. As part of any legislative discussion, the 
question on how the Security Council enacts its resolutions would arguably be an 
inevitable question to answer. However, ‘true international legislation’ will not be a part 
of the thesis as such, not involving a discussion on the executive powers of the Security 
Council as well as questions on the area of political science. In the present paper, the 
notion as such will be discussed below in part 2.4.  
 
As the paper title says, only binding resolutions of abstract-general contents will be 
addressed: not resolutions, which are either binding or general or abstract, or a 
combination of two of the factors. However, typical examples of the different types of 
resolutions will be presented for the purposes of illuminating the differences to binding 
abstract-general resolutions.  
 
10 
The present paper will limit itself to the consequence-side of the resolutions. That is: it 
will only be discussed if the adoption of binding abstract-general resolutions is within the 
Security Councils competences under the Charter, whereas the competences of the 
Security Council to address certain dangers or phenomena as ‘threat to the peace’ not will 
be addressed.  
 
There is of course a close connection between ‘threat to the peace’ as alternative criteria 
for application of Chapter VII in Article 39 and the binding non-military measures, which 
can be taken under Chapter VII, as found in Article 41. A negative answer to the question 
if the Security Council may determine abstract phenomena as ‘threat to the peace’ will of 
course lead to a negative answer to the question on adoption of binding abstract-general 
norms under Article 41, as the two questions are closely intertwined. For the purposes of 
the present thesis, it will, however, be assumed that the addressing of abstract dangers as 
a ‘threat to the peace’ does not exceed the margin of interpretation given the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.5
 
 
1.4 Legal framework, working methods and motivation 
 
The legal framework of the present thesis is in the first line the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Law of the United Nations. Important sources for illuminating the main 
question of the present paper is the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 and other resolutions of 
the Security Council, statements by the Council and by other organs of the Organization, 
implementation of the Member States, judgements by the ICJ and international tribunals 
as well as legal literature to the subject. 
   
                                                 
5
 For an in-dept discussion, see Aston 2005, page 80 ff.  
11 
Security Council Resolutions are binding on the Member States.6 The implementation, 
however, varies between different Member States: the Resolutions might have direct 
effect in line with a national law, or it might be required to adopt separate national laws it 
is binding in the state. The responsibility of the Member States under international public 
law to implement the resolutions is, however, the same, independent from system of 
implementation.  
 
Security Council Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter are the single 
opportunity there is in the international community to adopt binding measures without 
going through the process of negotiating a treaty on the subject. This is a powerful 
instrument, in which the Members of the Security Council are given both great powers 
and great responsibilities: the Council has got the “primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security”7, it might in the deployment of this 
intervene in matters which are normally of domestic character8 and its decisions prevail 
over other international obligations.9  
 
The norms found in the Charter of the United Nations are divided into primary norms, 
which put obligations on states, and secondary norms, which regulate the creation, 
modification and implementation of the primary norms.10 The secondary norms are of the 
most relevance for the present paper. The Charter of the United Nations will in the first 
line be interpreted to find whether it gives the Security Council the competences to adopt 
binding norms of abstract-general contents or not, before recourse might be taken to the 
general norms of public international law.  
 
                                                 
6
 Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter 
7
 UN-Charter, Article 24. 
8
 UN-Charter, Article 2 number 7. 
9
 UN-Charter, Article 103.  
10
 Marschik, page 459; Zemanek 1997, page 63 and 233-236. 
12 
As to the implementation of the resolutions, legal sources are found both in reports filed 
to the sub-organs established by the Security Council to supervise the implementation of 
the Resolutions as well as other documents created before, under and subsequent to the 
adoption of the Resolutions 1373 and 1540.  
 
Judicial literature has been applied to a great extent in the present paper. The main reason 
for this is that there is a lack of other sources of more weight on the subject. The question 
on the adoption of binding resolutions of abstract and general contents was until the 
adoption of Resolution 1373 in 2001 a theoretic question, which again makes the amount 
of judicial sources somewhat limited. For this reason, discussions in the literature become 
more important. To this comes that there are few available scripts focusing on just the 
adoption of simultaneously binding, abstract and general, something, which necessitates a 
broader spectre of both literature and other sources of weight to find information to 
encompass all the different sub-questions. 
 
The motivation of the present writer has been the highly contemporary and important 
character of the paper theme. Aspiring later studies in international politics, the paper 
theme has provided the present writer with interesting problems and ideas, of which some 
of course are outside the limitations of the paper theme. The process of writing the paper 
has of course been challenging, but clearly intellectually rewarding. The present writer 
has had the pleasure of researching for the paper in Berlin, utilizing the facilities of both 
the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin as well as the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin. The texts 
applied for the paper are in either English or German language.  
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 1.5 Structure  
 
In the first part of the paper, Chapter 2, the resolutions as such will be thoroughly 
analyzed. It will be illuminated why Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are of simultaneously 
binding, abstract and general character, why they are innovative, and why they pose a 
counterpoint to other resolutions previously adopted by the Security Council.  
 
In the second part of the paper, Chapter 3, it will be discussed if the Security Council 
within the frames for its competences found in the Charter of the United Nations may 
adopt resolutions containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and general 
character. That is: the Charter of the United Nations will be interpreted to find whether or 
not it gives the Security Council the competences to adopt such norms.  
 
If the answer to this is a negative one, which it arguably might be, recourse will be taken 
to the rules of interpretation found in public international law to determine if this would 
lead to a dissimilar result. The analysis will focus on an evolutionary and dynamic 
interpretation, in particular the implied powers rule, discussed in Chapter 4, before 
moving on to an analysis of the subsequent practice of the Security Council and the 
subsequent practice and implementation of the Member States in Chapter 5.  
 
In the conclusive part of the paper, a main question will be if the Security Council is 
breaking law by adopting binding resolutions of abstract-general contents, or if it is in 
fact making new law for the international community. As the questions of legitimacy and 
democracy are important when it comes to discussing if the Security Council should have 
the competences to adopt binding resolutions of abstract-general contents the de lege 
ferenda, these points will be discussed in the conclusive paragraphs, summing up the 
most important argumentation and the proposed future strategies for the Security Council 
to exercise its law-making function.  
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 2 Resolutions 1373 and 1540 – containing norms 
of simultaneously binding, abstract and general 
character 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are binding Security Council 
Resolutions, which contain norms of abstract and general character. In this Chapter, this 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general character of the Resolutions will be 
illuminated. In order to make the differences to Resolutions previously adopted by the 
Security Council clear, Resolutions 1373 and 1540 will be compared to previously hotly 
discussed resolutions, which are of either abstract-general but not binding or general and 
binding but not abstract character. Through this comparison, the innovative character of 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 will be illuminated.  
 
The Resolutions 1373 and 1540 contain norms, which put far-reaching obligations on the 
Member States. These norms have a particularly widespread impact: Firstly as they are 
general, that is: applies to a non-particular number of subjects or addressees in a not 
particular number of cases. Secondly as they are abstract, that is: not limited to a 
particular case, but applicable to any occurrence of certain phenomena. Thirdly as they 
are binding: as the Resolutions shall be both accepted and carried out by the Member 
States. The presence of these three factors simultaneously significantly differentiates the 
norms found in Resolutions 1373 and 1540 from previously adopted Resolutions by the 
Security Council.  
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 2.2 Disjoint presentation of the binding, abstract and general 
character of the Resolutions11 
 
2.2.1 The abstract character of the resolutions 
 
That a norm is of an abstract character would imply that it is not dependent on a concrete 
situation, and that it was applicable in any situation filling certain criteria.12 In this lies 
that the norm is not subject to timely or geographical restraints and that it is not 
interconnected with the presence of a certain situation. Norms of abstract contents are 
applicable on a not-particular number of hypothetical cases or situations.13
 
The norms of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 put general obligations on the Member States 
without confining itself to the concrete case. The fields of application for the Resolutions 
are not limited to a particular case of terrorism or a particular case of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. The norms of the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are, because 
they are applicable on every case of terrorism and on every case of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction with no limitation to any concrete situation, of an abstract 
                                                 
11
 There are arguably vague lines between the general and the abstract parts of particular resolutions, as 
illustrated by Happold , page 597: “For a particular norm to be truly general in nature, it needs to be 
applicable to all persons or particular classes of persons (rather than to specified individuals), in all 
circumstances or in all situations where particular criteria have been satisfied (rather than to specific 
situations or conduct). In other words, it should be composed of abstract legal propositions.” The vague 
contents could though be a result of differing use of terminology. A presentation of the different aspects 
will though for the purposes of clarity in the present paper be presented disjoint.  
12
 However, seemingly abstract regulations might materially only have consequences for a limited group, 
thus one must view to the material contents of the norm to determine if it is truly abstract or merely 
seeming so.  
13
 Wagner, page 268. 
16 
character;14 they are applicable on the phenomena per se. The norms found in the 
resolutions are not limited to the concrete case, but may be applied to an indefinite 
amount of hypothetical cases, and is not contextually limited to disciplining a particular 
country.  
 
The abstract field of application is particularly clear in the preambles of Resolutions 1373 
and 1540. Even the resolutions had particular incidents as direct reasons for being 
adopted,15 they do respond to terrorism and to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons as such. 
 
In Resolution 1373 the Security Council states that “any act of international terrorism[,] 
constitute a threat to international peace and security”16 and in Resolution 1540 of 2004, 
it affirms that “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as 
their means of delivery,[*] constitutes a threat to international peace and security”. 
These statements are determinations in the sense of Article 39, and determine the 
phenomena as such to be threats to the peace. Through this abstract determination, it is 
opened for the adoption of resolutions of binding abstract-general contents.17
 
The abstract character of the provisions in the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 is clear when it 
comes to the language, in which the resolutions are kept. The norms of the resolutions are 
more similar to norms of treaties as to norms found in previously adopted Security 
Council resolutions. In Resolution 1373, the language of the Resolution has its source in 
                                                 
14
 More precisely, the norms relate themselves to every case of financing of international terrorism and to 
every case of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
15
 SC-Res. 1373 of 2001 is clearly a response to the incidents in the USA September 11th 2001.  
16
 SC-Res. 1373 of 2001, preamble paragraph 2.  
17
 Furthermore, the fact that the phenomena are addressed as such in the resolutions would arguably make it 
logically inevitable for any norm aimed to fight these phenomena to be of an abstract character. 
Zimmermann/Elberling, page 71; Talmon page 181: “By their very nature, abstract threats require general 
measures to be taken”; Aston 2005, page 80; Herdegen 1995, pages 103 and 107. 
17 
the fact that the resolution to a large extent is based upon different existing conventions18 
on the counter terrorism area. The norms found in Resolution 1540 were adopted more 
independent of existing treaty material, but they are still kept in a treaty style language.19  
 
A proper implementation of the Resolutions requires significant national legislative 
measures.20 For example shall the Member States criminalize the collection of funds for 
terrorist purposes21, and “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws” to stop the 
proliferation on WMD.22 Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are without timely or geographic 
limitations.23 Neither Resolution 1373 nor Resolution 1540 contains explicit regulations 
on when its functioning time comes to an end.24 This means that the Resolutions 1373 
and 1540 can only be changed through a new resolution containing counter-norms, which 
must be adopted through the same rules of procedure and right to veto as the first 
resolution.25 Presumably, the resolutions will remain in force until the global threats of 
                                                 
18
 Common for these conventions is that they, because of lacking ratification, were not yet in force at the 
time the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373. 
19
 This finds it explanation in the fact that the resolution – according to the negotiations leading up to it – 
should “close gaps in existing treaty framework”.  
20
 SC-Res. 1373, operational paragraph 1 letter b: “Criminalize the wil[l]ful provision or collection (…) of 
funds (…) to carry out terrorist acts”. 
21
 Ibid.  
22
 SC-Res. 1540 of 2004, operational paragraph 2: “[A]dopt and enforce appropriate effective laws”. 
23
 See Aston 2002, page 258, 269; Zimmermann/Elberling, page 71 and 72; Szasz, page 901.  
24
 The Committee established to supervise the implementation of Resolution 1504 has got an official 
functioning time of two years. This, however, does not affect the functioning time of the norms of the 
Resolution.  
25
 The “reverse veto”; UN-Charter Art 27; Frowein/Krisch page 714, margin number 38; Caron, page 
578 ff. From an interpretation of the Charter, only the Security Council itself is in the position to end or to 
modify its actions. This 'reverse veto' makes the initial decision more important as the resolution is difficult 
to revere once it is adopted. 
18 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism have come to an 
end. This, however, could last decades.26
 
 
2.2.2 The general character of the resolutions 
 
Through addressing their norms at “all states”, the Resolutions 1373 and 1504 aim at a 
global field of application,27 which means that the resolutions are not limited to a 
particular area or to particular states. The resolutions are generally applicable.  
 
Furthermore, “all states” implies an expansion of the circle of addressees under Article 
41, a tendency, which has been present in the practice of the Security Council the last 
decade.28 This practice suggests that as the Security Council views as well Non-Member 
States as Member States bound by its Resolutions.  
 
Non-Member States may clearly be indirectly bound to comply with Security Council 
Resolutions through Article 2 (6) of the Charter. According to Article 2 (6), the Member 
States shall ensure that Non-Members act in accordance with the principles of the United 
Nations as far as this is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.29 Any resolution under Chapter VII would necessarily be adopted to maintain 
international peace and security30 and would thus be binding on Non-Member States.31
                                                 
26
 Rosand, page 550. 
27
 The notion ‘global resolutions’ might be applied: Stromseth page 41; Rosand, page 544: ”The threat of 
terrorism is a global one and the resolutions are therefore of a global nature”.  
28
 See SC-Res. 661 of 1991 Iraq and Kuwait; SC-Res. 1127 of 1997 Angola; SC-Res. 1297 of 2000 Eritrea 
and Ethiopia.  
29
UN-Charter Article 2 number 6.  
30
 See UN-Charter, Article 39. The Security Council has for this reason for more than a decade addressed 
“all states” in its resolutions under Chapter VII. 
31
 See Delbrück 2002, page 460; Frowein/Krisch, page 715, argue against binding force for enforcement 
19 
 Switzerland, however, as the most important Non-Member State rejects any obligation to 
follow Resolutions under Chapter VII and claims an “autonomous basis” for applying 
binding Security Council resolutions.32 Given the minor amount of Non-Member States, 
this discussion will not be continued here.33
 
 
2.2.3 The binding character of the Resolutions 
 
The Security Council states in the introductory to the operational paragraphs of 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540: “acting under Chapter VII”.34 This reference to Chapter VII 
means that the Council opens for taking binding measures. In the operational paragraphs 
of the Resolutions, the Council states that “all states shall”,35 which implies an intention 
of the Security Council that the norms shall be binding on the Member States.36 In 
accordance with Article 25 of the Charter, the Member States shall ‘accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council’.37 In order to be binding on the Member States, the 
norms found in the resolutions must be suitable to establish some concrete obligations on 
                                                                                                                                                 
measures against non-member States. The limited amount of Non-Member states makes the question 
mainly theoretic. 
32
 The Report of the Swiss Federal Council of July 1st 1998 in Bundesblatt No. 46 of 24th November 1998, 
pages 52-76; as quoted in Frowein/Krisch page 715. 
33
 It will in the further be referred to “Member States” even if as well Non- Member States could be 
encompassed.  
34
 SC-Res. 1373 of 2001 and SC-Res. 1540 of 2004, Introductory paragraphs to operational paragraphs. 
35
 SC-Res. 1373 of 2001 operational paragraph1 and 2; SC-Res. 1540 of 2004 operational paragraph 1,2 
and 3. 
36
 Generally on signs of binding character of Security Council Resolutions: Wood, page 82 ff. 
37
 The notion “to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter” is, however, not unambiguous: Delbrück 2002, page 455.  
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the Member States,38 something which the binding norms found in Resolutions 1373 and 
1540 largely are.39  
 
The general binding force of measures short of armed force adopted under Article 41 is 
from the wording “call upon the Members of the United Nations” is not clear.40 In the 
preparatory works to the United Nations Charter, however, the relevant committee at the 
San Francisco Conference referred to “obligations” as it discussed what was later to 
become Article 41.41 The Security Council has in its practice regarded measures adopted 
under Article 41 as binding, and this binding character of measures under Article 41 has 
been recognized by both Member States and by international tribunals.42
 
In adopting Resolutions 1373 and 1540, the Security Council established the Counter 
Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Committee established subsequent to Resolution 
1540.43 These Committees consist of all the Members of the Council, and the Member 
States are obliged to report on measures taken to implement the resolutions. The 
subsequent practices of the two committees have indeed shown that the Security Council 
                                                 
38
 Wagner, page 904. 
39
 This character is particularly clear where it is put duties on the national legislature, for example in 
Resolution 1373 of 2001, operational paragraph 1 letter b, after which the states shall criminalize the 
provision or collection of means to finance terrorism, and in operational paragraph 1 letter d, after which 
the states shall prohibit national institutions and entities to offer direct or indirect services to persons 
involved in the financing of terrorism. It might, however, be discussed if the notion “prevent and suppress 
the financing of terrorist acts” as found in Resolution 1373 operation paragraph is adequately concrete to 
establish obligations for the Member States: Wagner, page 904.  
40
 Frowein/Krisch, page 739, margin number 8. 
41
 UNICIO (United Nations International Conference on International Organization) XII, page 508: 
“obligations resulting from paragraph 3, section B” [which later became Article 41.] 
42
 See ICJ Lockerbie, Provisional measures, 1992, page 15, paragraph 39: “(…) Members of the United 
Nations, are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with 
Article 25 of the Charter; (…) the Court, (…) considers that primia facie this obligation extends to the 
decision contained in resolution 748  (1992) (…)”. 
43
 These committees are subsidiary organs of the Security Council, Article 29 of the Charter. 
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views the Resolutions as binding on the Member States. It is for these reasons clear that 
the norms found in Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are binding on the Member States.44
 
 
2.3 Simultaneously binding, abstract and general resolutions 
contra binding, abstract or general resolutions  
 
The question, which will be answered here, is what separates Resolutions 1373 and 1540 
from resolutions previously adopted by the Security Council. In sum, Resolutions 1373 
and 1540 are of simultaneously binding, abstract and general character, whereas the other 
resolutions, though some hotly debated for being “quasi legislative” are of either 
abstract-general but not binding character or of binding and general, but not abstract 
character. What exactly lies in this will be illuminated through examples from the 
practice of the Security Council. The cases have all been selected because of their far-
reaching consequences and because they in the contemporary debate have been hotly 
discussed as resolutions where the Security Council meet the borders of its competencies.  
 
 
2.3.1 ICTY and ICTR 
 
The resolutions establishing the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)45 and for Rwanda (ICTR)46 have been described as “legislative”47, 
“quasi-legislative”48 and “precariously close to international legislation”.49
                                                 
44
 That is: binding are the operational parts of the Resolutions where it is stated that “all states shall” and 
which are suitable to put obligations on the Member States.  
45
 SC-Res. 827 of 1993. 
46
 SC-Res. 955 of 1994. 
47
 Koskenniemi 1995, page 326. "The setting up of two ad hoc international war crimes tribunals to issue 
binding judgments seems already precariously close to international legislation." 
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 The statutes of the Tribunals contain both material and procedural rules to be applied by 
these. For the purposes of the present paper, it is the procedural provisions which are of 
the most relevance. These provisions require an amount of states to change their domestic 
legal process:50 Firstly, all states are obliged to cooperate with the Tribunals in the 
prosecution of persons accused of committing crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
tribunals and shall give effect to the requests of the Tribunals for judicial assistance.51 
Secondly, the Member States must postpone or adjourn domestic criminal proceedings 
when so requested by the Tribunals.52 Thirdly, the judgements of the ICTY and ICTR 
may not be retried through subsequent prosecution or retrials before national courts.53 
Fourthly, States shall give effect to orders issued by the ICTY for the surrender of 
person’s accused of crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. The norms in 
the resolutions are thus directed to indeterminate addressees and might be applied 
repeatedly until all justiciable cases have been tried.54  
 
However, the norms applied by the Tribunals are not materially new, but existing 
humanitarian law.55 The jurisdiction of the Tribunals is limited to specific situations56 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
48
 Kirgis, page 522, "quasi-legislative measures"; Wood page 78, "quasi-judicial organs"; Frowein/Krisch 
page 708, margin number 19. 
49
 Koskenniemi, page 326. 
50
 Rosand, page 549. 
51
 ICTY Statute, Article 29; ICTR Statute, Article 28. 
52
 ICTY Statute, Article 9. 
53
 ICTY Statute, Article 10. 
54
 Kirgis, page 522. 
55
 UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/25704, in ILM (International Legal Materials) 1993 page 1167, on the 
ICTY: "the Security Council would not be creating or purporting to 'legislate' that law. Rather more, the 
International Tribunal would have the task of applying existing international humanitarian law." This is 
“beyond any doubt part of customary law”; ibid, page 1170; Happold, page 596; Aston page 68. 
56
 UN Secretary-General, ibid, page 1167, on the establishment of the ICTY: “As an enforcement measure 
under Chapter VII the life span of the international tribunal would be linked to the restoration and 
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is circumscribed by their constituent documents.57 By establishing the Tribunals it was 
emphasized that to establish these were an ad hoc operations.58 In its Tadic-Jurisdiction 
decision59, the ICTY stated that the tribunal was established as “as an instrument for the 
exercise of its own principal function of the maintenance of peace and security, i.e. as a 
measure contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the former 
Yugoslavia”.60  
 
As the Resolutions establishing the ICTY and ICTR have a field of application limited to 
crimes of a certain character performed within particular areas in a particular time, and as 
the Tribunals will be in force only until their mandate has been fulfilled, the norms found 
in Resolutions 827 and 955 are not of abstract character even if they put widespread 
obligations are put upon the Member States. 
 
 
2.3.2 Economic sanctions 
 
Economic sanctions (embargos)61 adopted under article 41 of the Charter have been hotlz 
criticized for its widespread implications and have been described as acts of international 
                                                                                                                                                 
maintenance of international peace and security in the territory of the former Yugoslavia." In its Resolution 
827 on the establishment of the ICTY, the Security Council clearly refers to the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia, points to “the particular circumstances” and describes the establishment of the ICTY as an 
“ad hoc”-measure. See Happold, page 596. 
57
 Happold, page 596. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Here: ICTY Tadic, Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, 2 Oktober 
1995. 
60
 Ibid, paragraph 8.  
61
 For example: Embargoes against Afghanistan, binding on all states: Resolution 1267 of 1999 and 
Resolution 1333 of 2000; Sanctions regimes in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone. 
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legislation.62 The norms found in the resolutions imposing embargos on certain products, 
services and actions over years have the function that it regulates State behaviour world 
wide over extended periods of time. This might at first glance seem like abstract and 
general resolutions of binding character.63 The norms are suitable for repeated application 
over time,64 apply to a wide circle of addressees and might even be described as 
legislative in form.65  
 
Economic sanctions are, however, issued in response to a particular situation or to a 
particular conduct.66 Even if the sanctions are applicable to a not yet specified number of 
cases, they are linked to this country-specific or entity-specific situation. The sanctions 
are thereto only of preliminary effect; the measures will end as soon as threat to the peace 
– the situation or conduct leading to the sanctions – no longer exists.67 This makes 
economic sanctions under Article 41 not abstract-general68, but concrete-general.69  
 
 
2.3.3 Abstract and general, but not binding resolutions 
 
On several occasions, the Security Council has addressed questions on a general and 
abstract basis, but in none of these situations the Security Council has moved on to 
                                                 
62
 Kirgis, page 520. 
63
 Ibid.  
64
 Aston, page 268.  
65
 For example did the embargos in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia and in Sierra Leone have widespread 
impact on the communities as it established and kept for years embargoes on specific services, products and 
actions. Frowein/Krisch, page 708, margin number 21. 
66
 Happold, page 597. 
67
 Frowein/Krisch, page 709, margin number 21. The problem of the “reverse veto” has though had 
implications for sanctions regimes, for example in Iraq. 
68
 Or, in the words of Happold, page 597: “not composed of abstract legal propositions”. 
69
 Aston 2002, page 268.  
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adopting binding norms of abstract and general character. These Resolutions are attempts 
to set standards for the international community on a soft-law-basis. Common for all 
these resolutions is that they are with no timely or geographic limitations, and that they 
address the phenomena and not the situations. 
 
Non-binding resolutions of abstract and general contents have been made on a wide 
spectre of areas, for example when it comes to the importance of protection of civilians, 
with particular emphasis on children70 and women.71 The Security Council has in these 
resolutions emphasised its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security72 and the consequent impact on durable peace and on reconciliation.73  
 
I other non-binding resolutions of abstract and general contents, the Security Council has 
addressed the pandemic of HIV/AIDS,74 humanitarian questions75 and the illicit trade in 
small arms and light weapons.76 On the areas of international terrorism and of 
                                                 
70
 SC-Res 1265 of 1999; SC-Res 1296 of 2000; SC-Res 1314 of 2000. In SC-Res. 1261 of 1999 the 
Council expressed its grave concern at the harmful and widespread impact of armed conflict on children 
and the long-term consequences this has for durable peace, security and development. This was repeated in 
SC-Res. 1379 of 2001, preamble. In SC-Res. 1539 of 2004, preamble, the Council strongly condemned the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, the killing and maiming of children, rape and other sexual violence 
mostly committed against girls, abduction and forced displacement, denial of humanitarian access to 
children, attacks against schools and hospitals as well as trafficking, forced labour and all forms of slavery 
and all other abuses committed against children affected by armed conflict. 
71
 SC-Res 1265 of 1999; SC-Res 1296 of 2000; SC-Res 1325 of 2000; Presidential Statement 
S/PRST/2002/6. 
72
 SC-Res. 1460 of 2003, preamble; SC-Res. 1539 of 2004, preamble. 
73
 SC-Res. 1325 of 2000, preamble. 
74
 SC-Res.1308 of 2000, pp 11, stressing that if the pandemic remains unchecked, it might pose a threat to 
international peace and security. 
75
 SC-Res. 1296 of 2000, operational paragraph 5; SC-Res. 1314 of 2000, operational paragraph 9. 
76 SC-Res. 1366 of 2001, preamble, however focusing on Africa: "Expressing serious concern over the 
threat to peace and security caused by the illicit trade in and the excessive and destabilizing accumulation 
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proliferation of WMD, Resolutions containing not-binding norms of abstract-general 
contents have been adopted prior to Resolutions 1373 and 1540.77 These resolutions all 
have the Membership as such as addressees and have no temporal or geographical 
limitations. However, they contain no binding norms putting obligations on the Member 
States.  
 
In Resolutions 1172 of 1998 and Resolution 1368 of 2001, the Security Council in non-
binding resolutions determined that the phenomena of proliferation of WMD78 and 
international terrorism79 represented a ‘threat to the peace’.80 The Security Council did 
not adopt binding norms81 following these determinations, but a potential was clearly 
present.82  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of small arms and light weapons in areas of conflict and their potential to exacerbate and prolong armed 
conflicts"; SC-Res. 1209 of 1998; SC-Res. 1467 of 2003. 
77
 SC-Res. 1189 of 1998:  The SC calls upon “all States to adopt (…) effective and practical measures for 
(…) the prevention of such acts of terrorism, and for the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators” 
78
 SC-Res. 1172 of 6 June 1998, preamble paragraph: The Security Council addressed the proliferation of 
all weapons of mass destruction and stated that such activities “constitutes a threat to the international 
peace and security”.  
79
 SC-Res. 1386 of September 12th 2001, operational paragraph one: “regards such acts, like any act of 
international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security”. 
80
 It is clear that both resolutions are reactions on particular incidents; the terrorist incidents in the USA 
2001, and nuclear tests conducted by India and then Pakistan in 1998. This does not take away the general 
character of the determinations made. The thoughts on Resolution 1459 of 28th January 2003 and the 
unclear limitations apply here as well, see following paragraphs. 
81
 SC-Res. 1369 of 2001, operational paragraph 4: “calls upon” the states to “redouble their efforts to 
prevent and suppress terrorist acts”; SC-Res. 1172 of 1998, operational paragraph 14: “calls upon” the 
states to “become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. 
82 Any determination under Article 39 opens for an adoption of binding measures under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.  
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In Resolution 1459 of 28th January 2003, the Security Council notes the linkage between 
the illicit trade in rough diamonds and the fuelling of armed conflict83, supports the 
Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and encourages its further 
development.84 The resolution refers to norms of abstract and general character, but the 
Resolution does not put binding obligations on the Member States.  
 
The Resolution illustrates the blur lines between addressing particular situations and 
addressing phenomena as such: The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme is rooted in 
the sanctions regimes in Angola and Sierra Leone,85 sanctions regimes, which demanded 
a system to determine the origin of diamonds in order to ensure the sanctions to have 
effect. However, its circle of addressees is far wider than what would follow from an 
ordinary embargo.  
 
                                                 
83
 SC-Res. 1459 of 2003, preamble paragraph one. The SC notes “with deep concern the linkage between 
the illicit trade in rough diamonds from certain regions of the world and the fuelling of armed conflicts that 
affect international peace and security”; See also SC-Res. 1173 of June 12th 1998 and Resolution 1306 of 
July 5th 2000.  
84
 SC-Res. 1459 of 2003, operational paragraph one. The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme is a 
system, which mainly shall determine the origin of diamonds in order to prevent trafficking of “conflict 
diamonds”. See SC-Res. 1295 of 2000.   
85
 Krisch, page 892. 
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 2.4 Is the adoption of binding resolutions of abstract and 
general contents ‘true international legislation’?   
 
A discussion on whether or not the adoption of binding resolutions of abstract and 
general contents might be referred to as ‘true international legislation’ is of interest in 
order to place the present paper in the contemporary debate.86 Of course, the 
classification would depend on the definition applied.87 Arguably, a certain parallel must 
be drawn to legislation in national legislative systems.88 This implies that norms, which 
are to fall under the definition of ‘true international legislation’, must possess the same 
basic characteristics as legal norms on the national level. These characteristics are the 
provision of legal consequences and that they are binding for a not particular circle of 
addressees and are applicable on a not limited number of hypothetic cases.89 Applying 
                                                 
86
 See for example Guillaume, page 8: “By a broadened interpretation of its mandate, it is now assuming 
not only powers of action, but also legislative powers in the interest of international peace and security.” 
87
 A widely accepted definition of ‘international legislation’ is provided by Yemin in Legislative Powers in 
the United Nations and Specialized Agencies, 1969, page 6: ‘True international legislation’ might be 
defined as acts, which are unilateral in form, create or modify some element of a legal norm. This legal 
norm should be general in nature, that is: directed to indeterminate addressees and capable of repeated 
applications in time. There is no general consensus on the definition; Skubiszewski, page 1255. See Aston 
2005, page 52 ff; Alvarez 2003 page 120; Happold, page 597-98; Kirgis, page 520; Rosand, page 2; further 
references to attempted definitions are found in Skubiszewski, page 1255 ff. 
88
 The contents of the notion ‘true international legislation’ might be attempted defined as a parallel to 
national legal systems or not, see Aston, page 46 ff. Skubiszewski, page 1255, finds this national parallel a 
logical necessity: "In logic, the notion international legislation should mean such law-making among States 
or inter-governmental organizations which in its basic features remains identical with legislation in a 
state". See also Talmon, page 176.  
89
 Aston 2002, page 268: “Eine rechtsverbindliche Anordnung hat im nationalen Recht aber nur dann den 
Charakter einer Rechtsnorm, wenn sie für eine unbegrenzte Anzahl hypothetischer Fälle für einen 
unbestimmten Kreis von Normadressaten eine Rechtsfolge vorsieht, wenn sie also abstrakt-genereller 
Natur ist.“ Skubiszewski 1965, page 202:“That a law-making resolution lays down general and abstract 
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this definition, binding norms of abstract and general contents are ‘true international 
legislation’. 
 
However, in national systems, there are branches of power endowed with the power to 
enforce the legislation provided by the legislature. Such an “international executive” is 
not existent in the international community today.90 The powers of the Security Council 
to enforce its Resolutions are mainly political. This is the main argument against applying 
the notion ‘true international legislation’ from a national parallel on binding resolutions 
containing abstract- general norms by the Security Council. On the other side, it might be 
argued that Security Council Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII will to a large 
degree be followed by meaningful sanctions91 suggesting that the norms will be 
convincingly enforced.92 Furthermore, the most distinctive sign of a normative legislative 
act is its general applicability93 that is, the abstract-general character of the norm. This 
characterization would apply well on Resolutions 1373 and 1540.94
 
                                                                                                                                                 
runes of conduct is an obvious requirement (…). Hence, the binding resolutions of international 
organisations must be divided, for our purposes, into those which create law and those which are executive 
in character (…).  
90
 Even if the Security Council is referred to as the “world police”, the UN possesses no own executive 
forces.  
91
 The Security Council has for example defined the non-compliance with its resolutions a ‘threat to the 
peace’ and thereafter adopted binding resolutions under Chapter VII in response to this non-compliance: 
SC-Res. 748 of 1992 on Libya/Lockerbie: “the failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by 
concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and 
effectively to the requests in Resolution 731 (1992) constitute a threat to international peace and security”; 
SC-Res. 1070 of 1996 on Sudan; SC-Res. 1333 of 2000 on Afghanistan. See Allain, page 102-107. 
92
 See Alvarez 2003 page 120.  
93
 Tomuschat 1993, page 346. 
94
 Authors have for this reason found the Resolutions ‘truly legislative’: Aston 2005, page 69 and 89; 
Finke/Wandscher, page 171; Dicke, page 163; Szasz, page 901; Talmon, page 118; Stromseth 2003, page 
41. 
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In the view of the present writer, this general applicability of resolutions of 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general character is a decisive argument in direction 
of determining such resolution ‘true international legislation’,95 despite the lack of an 
international executive force. The Council might for this reason arguably be referred to as 
a “world legislature”.96 The conclusion on the question, however, remains open. It is 
clear that ‘true international legislation’ defined through parallels to national parameters 
would be a new encounter in public international law, where “hard law” traditionally is 
created either through treaties between states or by means of “law-creating” customary 
practice. Before 2001, the question on the competences of the Security Council to adopt 
‘true international legislation’ was, a merely theoretical question, and was, when even 
asked, answered negatively.97  
 
                                                 
95
 Pro that the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 (only 1373 when the articles are from pre 2004) are: Aston 2005, 
page 258; Stromseth, page 41 (“legislative in nature”); Rosand, page 544; Alvarez AJIL 2003, page 874-
875; Szasz page 901 ff.; Happold page 593: “True legislative act”.  
96
 As which it has been referred to on several occasions: Referred to "legislator" in: Alvarez, War on 
Terrorism 2003, page 238 and 241; Happold, page 596; Krisch 2003, page 883. Refereed to as "world 
legislator" (“Weltgesetzgeber”) in Dicke, page 163; Finke/Wandscher, page 172; Krisch Rise and Fall 
2003, page 884: “by means of its enforcement powers, the Security Council has in fact replaced the 
conventional law-making process on the international level”. 
97
 Oppenheim page 114: "there is no machinery of international legislation"; ICTY Tadic page 32, 
paragraph 43: "There is ... no legislature, in the technical sense of the term, in the United Nations system... 
That is to say, there exists no corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws directly binding on 
international legal subjects." 
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 2.5 Conclusions on Resolutions 1373 and 1540 resolutions 
containing norms of simultaneously abstract, general and 
binding contents 
 
Security Council Resolutions 1373 of 2001 and 1540 of 2004 are resolutions, which are 
at the same time abstract, general and binding. The abstract character is emphasized 
through the statements in the preambles of the Resolutions where phenomena as such are 
viewed as threats to the peace. This is continued in the operational paragraphs, through 
which international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction shall be 
prevented. The norms are without any timely or geographic limitations, are applicable on 
every occurrence of a certain phenomena and demand widespread inner-state legislation. 
 
The simultaneously abstract, binding and general character of the Resolutions makes the 
Resolutions novelties in the practice of the Security Council, as they are clearly 
differentiable both from previously adopted resolutions98, like sanctions regimes, 
International Criminal Tribunals and other peace-enforcing measures and resolutions 
setting non-binding standards on different areas, even if these have had widespread 
impact.99  
 
It is clear that the Security Council previously has adopted binding measures in relation 
to single acts of terrorism or of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, 
                                                 
98
 These previously adopted norms might be described as “judicial law-making”: The Court applies an 
existing rule in light of a particular situation and thereby creates a new rule, which is limited to refining and 
developing the older norm: Happold, page 598. 
99
 The lines between the different categories might though appear ambiguous, as for example in the 
previously mentioned resolution 1459 of 2003 on the Kimberly Certification Scheme; where the Security 
Council noted “with deep concern the linkage between the illicit trade in rough diamonds from certain 
regions of the world and the fuelling of armed conflicts that affect international peace and security”. 
Ambiguity is for example as well found in SC-Res. 1172 of 6 June 1998. 
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there is a great difference from binding measures in concrete cases to binding norms 
applicable to the phenomena on a general basis.100  
 
The Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are of great importance not only for the Member States, 
but furthermore for a potentially large amount of individuals and entities as the 
Resolutions oblige the states to adopt new inner-state legislation, including criminal law, 
on numerous areas.101  
 
Because of their simultaneously abstract, general and binding character, the resolutions 
resemble national legislation. At least concerning the material contents, the Resolutions 
1373 and 1540 might be referred to as ‘true international legislation’.102 Whether one 
agrees upon the use of the notion ‘true international legislation’ or not does not change 
the fact that what separates the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 from previously adopted 
Security Council Resolutions is their simultaneously binding, abstract and general 
contents. 
 
                                                 
100
 Talmon, page 182 seem to hold the opposite opinion: “If the Security Council can require states to 
freeze the funds of every single person who commits a specific terrorist act, it must – a fortiori – also be 
able to order states to freeze the funds of all persons who commit such acts.” 
101
 In particular operational paragraph 1 letters b,c and d and 2 letter e of Resolution 1373 and operational 
paragraph 2 of Resolution 1540.  
102
 UN Doc. A/56/PV.25 of 2001, page 3, "In short, for the first time in history, the Security Council 
enacted legislation for the rest of the international community" (the representative of Costa Rica on 
Resolution 1373). Aston 2002, page 267: “Dieses neue Verständnis des Gefahrenbegriffs bedeutet nicht 
nur einen qualitativen Sprung auf der Tatbestandsebene des Art. 39 VN-Charta, sondern hat auch auf der 
Rechtfolgenseite zu Maßnahmen des Sicherheitsrats geführt, die aufgrund ihres echten legislative 
Charakters ohne Präzedenzfall sind.“.  
33 
 3 
                                                
Is the adoption of binding resolutions 
containing binding norms of abstract and 
general character coherent with the Charter of 
the United Nations?  
 
In the Tadic- Decision in the ICTY, Judge Sidhwa in a separate opinion stated “since the 
Tribunal to be established was of a limited nature, for a limited purpose, for a limited 
time, for a limited territory and for offenders who had committed offences within the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, the decision was valid and fair, and squarely fell 
within Art. 41 of the Charter.”103  
 
It might be argued that following the counter argumentation to this statement, 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are established to concur an abstract danger, they are global 
without any timely or geographic limitations and do not limit themselves to any particular 
situations. Until 2001, the question of whether the Security Council had the competence 
adopt resolutions containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and general 
character was a mere theoretic question.104 It has been argued that the Security Council in 
the principle is not in the position to create general rules binding on the Member States105 
and that the powers of the Security Council are limited to the concrete case only.106 To 
conclude from this that the resolutions were adopted ultra vires, would, however, be too 
hasty. A determination on whether or not the Security Council had the competences to 
adopt Resolutions 1373 and 1540 must in the first place be made through an 
 
103
 ICTY Tadic (Appeals Chamber), page 562. 
104
 Aston page 63; evident in Kirgis, page 520.  
105
 Arangio-Ruiz page 629-630, Stein page 61-63, Kelsen page 295. 
106
 Frowein/Krisch page 709 margin number 22. 
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interpretation of the relevant notions of the United Nations Charter: ‘threat to the peace’ 
as found in Article 39, and ‘measures short of armed force’ as found in Article 41.  
 
Through a determination under Article 39, the Security Council opens for taking 
measures under Chapter VII, including under Article 41. In this lies that the Security 
Council must make a determination on the existence of a “threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or an act of aggression” before any binding measures might be adopted.  
 
The interpretation is based upon that the Security Council as well when it acts under 
Chapter VII is bound by public international law in so far that it has to respect limits to its 
powers set forwards by the Charter of the United Nations, which again implies that the 
discussion is based upon the idea that there are in fact limitations for the powers of the 
Security Council.107  
 
                                                 
107
 See ICTY Tadic (Appeals Chamber), ILM 1996, page 32 ff; ICTR Kanyabashi. Even if it arguably is a 
difference between the law and the practice, a reference to the actual power of the Security Council would 
not be satisfactory. See Wagner, page 906. Koskeniemmi, page 327: “Authority is a normative and not a 
factual category.” 
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 3.1 The ordinary meaning of the terms – the textual approach 
 
The question, which will be answered in this paragraph, is if the Security Council within 
the ordinary meaning of the Charter terms may adopt binding resolutions containing 
norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and general nature.  
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties108 (VCLT) Article 31 (1) sets the rule 
that the provisions of the Charter are to be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty”.109 The ordinary meaning of a term might 
only be determined when its context is taken into concern.110 To take the context into 
concern in the textual interpretation is coherent with the dynamic-evolutionary method of 
interpretation.111 In this dynamic-evolutionary method, both the will of the parties and the 
purpose of the international Organization are arguments to be taken into concern in the 
interpretation process.112
                                                 
108
 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted 22 May 1969, entry into force 27 January 1980. 
The provisions of the VCLT apply per analogy, as the Charter is adopted subsequent to the VCLT; ICJ 
Namibia (1971), page 47: (regarding Article 60 VCLT) the provisions of the VCLT “ (…) may in many 
respects be considered as a codification of existing customary law on the subject”; ICJ Botswana/Namibia, 
1999, page 1045: “customary international law finds expression in Article 31 VCLT”; Ress, page 18. 
109
 ICJ IMCO, 1960, page 158: “usual or common meaning”; ICJ Territorial Dispute, 1994, page 21; ICJ 
Oil Platforms, 1996, page 812.  
110
 Ress, page 20; ICJ IMCO, 1960, page 158: “The meaning of the word ‘elected’ in the Article cannot be 
determined in isolation by recourse to its usual or common meaning and attaching that meaning to the 
word where used in this Article. The word obtains its meaning from the context in which it is used. If the 
context requires a meaning which connotes a wide choice, it must be construed accordingly, just as it must 
be given a restrictive meaning if the context in which it is used so requires.”  
111
 This method is the counterpart of the earlier dominating static method of interpretation. Ress, page 24. 
112
 ICJ Namibia, 1971: the Courts “interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development 
of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an 
international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system 
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3.1.1  ‘Threat to the peace’  
3.1.1.1 Are single acts of international terrorism and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction encompassed? 
 
In Resolution 1373, the Security Council determined “all acts of international terrorism” 
a threat to the international peace and security. The notion ‘international terrorism’ is not 
a clear notion, and Resolution 1373 does not attempt any definition of the term.113 
Lacking such a definition, the determination of whether an act of terrorism is a threat to 
the peace or not is highly dependent both on the individual situation and on which 
definition of ‘international terrorism’ one choose to employ. The situation is particularly 
unclear when it comes to state-nationals attacking state or private property inside of the 
very same state.114 Arguably, this is not ‘international terrorism’, but the label is easily 
employed the individuals performing the terrorist acts are part of a terrorist network. 
However, even if no clear definition is provided or agreed upon and the outer limits of 
the notion are blurring, the notion terrorism115 in its core contains the minimum factor of 
                                                                                                                                                 
prevailing at the time of the interpretation”. This however, does not for the purposes of the present paper 
force the discussion on implied powers, which is found below in part 4. 
113
 For which the Resolution has been heavily criticized. The General Assembly's Sixth Committee is 
currently considering a draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism where a definition of 
terrorism should be included: http://www.un.org/ga/57/sixth/index.html 
114
 See also Happold, page 595. In his opinion, not all acts of terrorism constitute threats to international 
peace and security: “It is difficult to see, for example, how an incendiary device in a furrier’s shop is a 
threat to the peace”. Again, different perceptions clearly root in different understandings of the notion 
‘terrorism’. 
115
 Aston 2005, page 114; Wagner page 882; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism 
UN-Doc A/9028, which on page 11-12 in 1972 concluded that it was impossible to agree on a definition of 
the notion ‘terrorism’.   
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the use of violence against persons.116 This would be decisive for the determination of 
individual acts of international terrorism as ‘threats to the peace’.117
 
When it comes to Resolution 1540, the acts described as a ‘threat to international peace 
and security’ were not the actual use of weapons of mass destruction,118 but the 
proliferation of such. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a mere trading 
process and does not involve the use of force against persons or objects. Individual acts 
of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction between the known and accepted atom 
powers are for example no ‘threat to the peace’.  
 
There is a large step between the possession of weapons of mass destruction and the 
actual employment these weapons. A single act of proliferation would with less necessity 
pose a threat to the peace then an act of terrorism. The main fear attached with the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is, however, the danger of such weapons 
coming into possession of terrorist entities,119 and that the weapons are subsequently 
either employed or used for extortion purposes. The great destructive potential of WMD 
makes the proliferation of such closely interconnected with the use of force. The 
potentially widespread implications of such weapons in the hands of both terrorists and 
other non-state entities is the decisive for a determination of the mere proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction would isolated pose a ‘threat to the peace’.120
                                                 
116
 See for example the proposed definition in Wagner, page 884-887; his result is based on an analysis of 
the present anti-terrorism-conventions and national laws as well as attempted definitions in the legal theory. 
117
 Aston 2002, page 276-277; Graefrath page 196; Frowein/Krisch, page 726 margin number 23: 
“international terrorism (…) creates severe destabilizing effects on the international order”; Krisch, page 
882.  
118
 On the general use of nuclear weapons, the Security Council has stated that "any aggression with the use 
of nuclear weapons would endanger international peace and security": SC-Res. 948 of 1995, preamble. 
119
 SC-Res. 1540 of 2001, preamble paragraph 8. 
120
 A different conclusion would arguably be the matter for the proliferation of the “means of delivery” for 
weapons of mass destruction, which as well pose a ‘threat to the peace’, see SC-Res. 1540 of 2004, 
preamble paragraph 1. 
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3.1.1.2 Preventive contents 
 
Both Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are resolutions of preventive contents as they refer to 
terrorism and proliferation, which have not yet been committed. Terrorism shall be 
prevented for the future, as shall the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-
state entities.  
 
From a lingual point of view, a ‘threat to the peace’ exists where there is an imminent 
danger of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.121  Logically a threat to the peace 
would always lie timely before a breach of the peace. The Security Council holds the 
primary responsibility for the “maintenance of international peace and security”. The 
use of the notion “maintenance” as oppose to for example “re-establish” and it is clear 
that the powers of the Security Council are of a certain preventive character. The notion 
‘threat to the peace’ might be applicable to specific situations on a preventive basis.122  
 
Both international terrorism and proliferation of WMD to non-state entities are actions, 
which arguably require planning time ahead. This is an argument pro a right for the 
Security Council to determine certain acts of international terrorism and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction as ‘threats to the peace’ before this threat has materialised 
itself.  
 
This indicates that the addressing of at least particular acts of international terrorism or 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction before the actions has been taken, would lie 
within the competencies of the Security Council. 
 
                                                 
121
 Frowein/Krisch, page 722, margin number 16; Arntz, page 64. 
122
 Frowein/Krisch, page 720, margin number 6 and page 722, margin number 16; Aston 2005, page 90. 
39 
 3.1.1.3 Preventive contents for phenomena as such 
 
The Resolutions 1373 and 1540 goes further than to determine particular situations of 
international terrorism or proliferation of WMD as threats to the peace: the phenomena 
are determined ‘threat to the peace’ as such. Even if the Security Council might within its 
competencies under Chapter VII of the Charter determine a single act of terrorism a 
‘threat to the peace’ even on a preventive basis, the question on the addressing of such 
dangers on a general basis is not answered. Such powers for the Security Council would 
imply a highly more extensive use of its powers than an ordinary preventive use of its 
powers in an individual situation would imply. 
 
This raises a question of outmost importance for the present thesis: Might the Security 
Council determine the phenomena international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction as such as ‘threats to the peace’? An affirmative answer to this would 
imply that the Security Council might determine a form of behaviour as such a threat to 
the international peace and security for every situation to come rather than to make such a 
determination individually to every manifestation of a particular behaviour.  
 
From a lingual point of view, the core of the notion ‘threat to the peace’ encompasses 
concrete and particular situations, that is, situations, which if they escalate, may result in 
a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.123 This finds support in the fact that the 
measures found in Chapter VII are measures of a more concrete nature.124 The heading of 
Chapter VII125 supports an interpretation where the notion ‘threat to the peace’ only 
                                                 
123
 Frowein/Krisch, page 772 describe the typical ‘threat to the peace’ as an impending conflict between 
states, where the danger of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression is imminent.  
124
 This is especially clear in Article 42 on military measures, but as well in the explicitly mentioned 
measures in Article 41. 
125
 Reading: ‘acts of aggression’. 
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encompasses specific situations.126 In Chapter VI, which is meant to form a preliminary 
stage to Chapter VII, notions indicating a particular conflict are used.127 These factors all 
support a view that the notion ‘threat to the peace’ is limited to concrete situations. 
Outside of this core meaning, the notion ‘threat to the peace’ has broad and indistinct 
boundaries, and an equally broad field of application.128  
 
The content of the notion ‘threat to the peace’ has developed over the years,129 and it now 
encompasses a variety of situations, which all have in common that they fundamentally 
threaten the peace.130 As consequence of this development of the understanding of the 
notion ‘threat to the peace’, the ordinary meaning of the notion ‘threat to the peace’ 
remains open when it comes to whether it encompasses the general addressing of certain 
phenomena or not.  
 
 
3.1.2 A close interconnection  
 
There is of course a close relationship between the determination of a ‘threat to the 
peace’ and the adoption of measures short of armed force under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. This close interconnection between the notions was made quite clear by the 
ICTY in the Tadic-decision: “As set out above (…) we are of the view that the Security 
                                                 
126
 Happold, page 599.  
127
 Article 33 ff.: ‘any dispute’, ‘any situation’, ‘the parties’. 
128
 Zimmermann/Elberling, page 72. ‘Threat to the peace’ is almost the sole alternative of those found in 
Article 39 that the Security Council uses, see Frowein/Krisch, page 722, margin number 16. 
129
 See paragraph 4.3.3 below.  
130
 As a part of the same development, the Security Council has gone from limiting its understanding of the 
notion ‘peace’ to the absence of armed violence and hostilities between states (the negative understanding 
of the notion) to encompassing further factors of importance of the existing of lasting peace, such as the 
friendly relations between states, democracy and stabile economic relations. 
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Council was endowed with the power to create this International Tribunal as a measure 
under Chapter VII in the light of its determination that it exists a threat to the peace.”131
 
This close relationship between the notions might arguably lead to the conclusion that 
when the Security Council is in the position to determine a phenomenon as such a ‘threat 
to the peace’ it shall as well be in the position to adopt binding decisions to fight these 
dangers under Article 41 of the Charter.132 This line of argumentation would imply that if 
the Security Council had the competencies to address an abstract danger as a ‘threat to 
the peace’ it would necessarily have the competencies to adopt binding resolutions of 
abstract and general content.133
 
The notions ‘threat to the peace’ and the adoption of simultaneously binding, abstract and 
general norms under Chapter VII of the Charter might be closely intertwined. However, a 
positive answer to the question if the abstract phenomena of international terrorism and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are encompassed by Article 39 of the 
Charter does not automatically allow for the adoption of such norms – the legal basis not 
just for addressing- but as well for taking measures must be interpreted.  
 
                                                 
131
 ICTY, Tadic Appeals Chamber, page 47, paragraph 44. 
132
 Aston 2005, page 103: “Alle andere würde zu einer systemwidrigen Inkordonanz zwischen der Art der 
nach Art 39 UN-Charta festgestellten Friedensbedrohung und der Natur der Art. 41 UN-Charta 
beschlossenen Maßnahmen führen.”; Zimmermann/Elberling, page 71; Talmon, page 181: “By their very 
nature, abstract threats require general measures to be taken”. 
133
 The notions will here be attempted interpreted individually. As the interconnection exists, a negative 
answer on either the addressing of abstract dangers or on the adoption of binding resolutions containing 
abstract-general norms, will lead to the conclusion that the Security Council lacks the competencies to 
adopt binding resolutions containing abstract-general norms.  
42 
 3.1.3 ‘Measures short of armed force’ 
 
The Resolutions 1373 and 1540 contain obligations upon the Member States of 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general character. The Charter itself does not 
explicitly open for the Security Council to adopt resolutions containing such norms. 
 
It is clear that the relevant Article of the Charter is Article 41. This negatively limits the 
measures it allows for to ‘measures short of armed force’, which implies that the Security 
Council may not adopt military measures on the legal basis of Article 41.134 The 
discretionary powers of the Security Council regarding which measures are needed to put 
an end to the situation are thus wide.135 Such wide discretionary powers for the Security 
Council do not mean that it may take any measures short of armed force. 
 
Article 41 contains a catalogue of measures136. However, this list is not exhaustive.137 
Article 41 may comprise further measures than those it explicitly mentions. Lingual, the 
notion ‘measures short of armed force’ is wide enough to comprise as well the adoption 
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 ICTY Tadic Appeals Chamber, page 17 paragraph 35: “It is evident that the measures set out in Article 
41 are merely illustrative examples which obviously do not exclude other measures. All the Article requires 
is that they do not involve ‘the use of force’. It is a negative definition.” 
135
 Ibid, paragraph 39. 
136
 Reading:“These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” 
137
 Article 41: “may include”; ICTY Tadic Appeals Chamber, page 17 paragraph 35; ICTR Kanyabashi 
Jurisdiction, paragraph 27: “While it is true that establishment of judicial bodies is not directly mentioned 
in Article 41 of the UN Charter as a measure to be considered in the restoration and maintenance of peace, 
it clearly falls within the ambit of measures to satisfy this goal. The list of actions contained in Article 41 is 
clearly not exhaustive but indicates some examples of the measures which the Security Council might 
eventually decide to impose on States in order to remedy a conflict or an imminent threat to international 
peace and security.” 
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of binding resolutions containing abstract-general norms,138 but read in the context of the 
measures explicitly listed in Article 41, the notion would arguably refer only to measures 
relating to a particular situation. The measures listed in Article 41 are exclusively 
concrete measures, which logically may be directed either to a particular state or to a non-
particular amount of states in relation to a particular conflict.139 To adopt resolutions with 
abstract-general contents would mean adopting measures qualitatively different from the 
measures explicitly described in Article 41.  
 
In the drafting of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Legal 
Committee commented upon the report of the Working Group. This had mentioned it as 
an alternative method to establish the ICC to do this through a Security Council 
Resolution. The ILC made the remarks that it must be distinguished between the 
authority to establish a Tribunal as response to a particular situation and to establish a 
permanent institution with general powers and competence. It concluded that Chapter VII 
of the Charter envisaged action with respect to a particular situation.140
 
It might thus be argued that from a textual interpretation of the notion ‘measures short of 
armed force’, the measures to disposal for the Security Council under Article 41 are 
concrete measures with a limited circle of addressees.141 Article 41 for this reason does 
not open for the adoption of binding resolutions containing abstract-general norms.142  
                                                 
138
 Talmon, page 181; Aston, page 283; Wagner, page 879, 907-909 and 913; Schachter 1988, page 12; 
Happold, page 594; Frowein/Krisch, page 740. Contra: Arangio-Ruiz, page 723.  
139
 This is the case when for example diplomatic relations shall be severed: this affects all the states with 
diplomatic relations with the state in question, but does not affect all states on a general basis, i.e. does not 
severe every diplomatic relation between every state.  
140
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 3 May 1994, UN-
Doc A/49/10 of 1994, found in YBILC 1994, page 22: “[There is a distinction] between the authority of 
the Council to establish an ad hoc tribunal in response to a particular situation under Chapter VII of the 
Charter and the authority to establish a permanent institution with general powers and competence. 
141
 Zimmermann/Elberling, page 72. 
142
 Zemanek 1999, page 636-637: “The word ‘measures’ (…) does not suggest that it [the Security 
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3.2 The systematic approach and the historic- and historic-
subsequent practice approaches 
 
A systematic interpretation of the powers of the Security Council implies an 
interpretation of the UN-Charter as a whole.143 Significant parts of a systematic 
interpretation are comparisons of the different parts of the treaty, distinctions between 
different parts of the treaty and considerations on the whole treaty structure.144  
 
The General Assembly has got the primary responsibility for “encouraging the 
progressive development of international law and its codification”.145 If one holds the 
view that the Security Council through adopting norms of simultaneously binding, 
abstract and general contents is creating ‘true international legislation’ this would be hard 
to unify with the distribution of competences within the Charter.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Council] may generate rules of general international law by decision (…) The ordinary meaning of the 
word in the context (…) indicates a specific action intended t achieve a concrete effect and, thus, a 
temporary, case-related reaction to one of the situations referred to in Article 39; it does not include the 
abstract prescription of future rules of genera conduct for an indefinite period of time.” In favour of 
limiting the powers of the Security Council to particular situations are: Happold, page 608; Frowein/Krisch, 
page 708-709; Arangio-Ruiz, page 629; Wood, page 77. More negative to such limitations: Aston 2005, 
page 95. 
143
 PCIJ, Competences of the ILO, 1922, page 23: “In considering the question before the Court upon the 
language of the Treaty, it is obvious that the Treaty must be read as a whole, and that its meaning is not to 
be determined merely upon particular phrases which, if detached from the context, may be interpreted in 
more than one sense.”; Ress, page 31-32;  
144
 ICJ Certain Expenses, 1962, page 162: “Passing from the text of Article 17 to its place in the general 
structure and scheme of the Charter, the Court will decide whether in that broad context (…)”; ibid, page 
167: “The Court has considered the general problem of the interpretation of Article 17, paragraph 2, in the 
light of the general structure of the Charter and of the respective functions assigned by the Charter to the 
General Assembly and to the Security Council, with a view to determining the meaning of the phrase ‘the 
expenses of the Organization’.”; Ress, page 32. 
145
 UN-Charter, Article 13 number 1 letter a.  
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Arguably, the norms found in Resolutions 1373 and 1540 will have great influences of 
the development of international law. The Resolutions were, as stated in the discussions 
leading up to the adoption, respectively adopted because the ordinary development of 
treaty law went to slow146 and in order to fill holes in existing international law.147 This 
would imply that the norms found in Resolutions 1373 and 1540 in the reality enter an 
area, which in the Charter was intended exclusively for the General Assembly.  
 
However, the General Assembly has, despite its important task of encouraging the 
progressive development of international law and its codification148 got no powers to 
adopt resolutions containing norms binding on the Member States. It might only make 
recommendations or negotiate treaties to be adopted through the ordinary procedures of 
agreement between the state parties. This would arguably make it reasonable to allow the 
Security Council to make binding resolutions containing norms of abstract and general 
contents when the need for such norms is present in the world community.149   
 
The Security Council has been described as the “policeman” of the international 
community.150 This view is based upon the very wide competences of the Security 
Council to adopt binding resolutions on the Member States within very short time and a 
lack of both transparency and representation by the Member States. The role of the 
Security Council as “world policeman” would from a parallel to powers of a national 
police force be limited to taking action in particular situations. 
 
Article 2 number 7 of the Charter could explicitly exclude powers for the Security 
Council to adopt binding resolutions containing norms of abstract-general contents, as 
this prohibits any interference in the domestic jurisdiction accept from “enforcement 
                                                 
146
 This was a main argument for adopting Resolution 1373 of 2001.  
147
 This was a main argument for adopting Resolution 1540 of 2004.  
148
 UN-Charter, Article 13, number 1 letter a.  
149
 More on this below in Part 4 on implied powers and the dynamic interpretation of the Charter.  
150
 Koskenniemi, page 338-339. 
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matters under Chapter VII”.151 Obviously, abstract-general norms are not “enforcement”. 
However, the notion is not defined in the Charter, and through the practice of the Security 
Council and the implementation by the Member States, it is now accepted that Article 2 
(7) is applicable to any resolution adopted under Chapter VII. 
 
With particular regard to the norms found in Resolution 1540, these are to large degree 
norms, which will influence the armaments of the Member States and not only non-states 
entities. Clearly, the Security Council has of course got the power to regulate arms and so 
on in particular situations. This, however, does not necessarily include a competence to 
take general measures for the limitations of armaments, or possibly to regard armament 
by States in itself as a threat to the peace.152 In principle, the Member States decide freely 
on the regulation of their armaments. In the United Nations Organisation, the General 
Assembly shall consider the principles governing the disarmament and the regulation of 
armaments.153 The Security Council may address these matters, but then only in form of 
plans, which it might submit to the Member States.154  
 
A historic interpretation of the notion ‘threat to the peace’ and ‘measures short of armed 
force’ might be of interest to illuminate both the understanding of the notions possessed 
by the Charter fathers as well as by the early interpreters of the notions. In the 
preparatory works of the Charter, it was attempted to define the notion “aggression”, 
which was the most controversial at the time. The notion, however remained undefined, 
as the modern techniques of warfare rendered any definition of ‘aggression’ 
impossible.155 This shows how the founders if the Charter were open for a dynamic 
interpretation of the Charter. 
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 Discussed by Marschik, page 462.  
152
 UN-Charter, Article 26; Frowein/Krisch, page 726, margin number 24.  
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 UN-Charter, Article 11 number 1.  
154
 UN-Charter, Article 26. 
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 Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-47, page 26.  
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In the Spanish Question, the Security Council refused to adopt a resolution in which the 
mere existence of the Franco-Regime in Spain was determined a ‘threat to the peace’. 
The Security Council proved sceptic to an expanded interpretation of the Charter and 
found that even if the Franco regime did cause international friction, it was no ‘threat to 
the peace’.156 The reasoning behind this was that the Council interpreted its role to be 
restricted to responding to particular and concrete dangers.157  
 
The systematic and historic interpretation favours an interpretation of ‘threat to the 
peace’, which only encompasses concrete situations158 and that the Security Council thus 
not were in the position to adopt binding resolutions containing norms of abstract and 
general contents.  
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 Yearbook of the United Nations (YUN), 1946-47, page 348. 
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 Ibid., page 345. 
158
 See Zimmermann/Elberling, page 73; Aston 2005, page 96, concludes that there is no clear answer; 
Happold, page 601: "Neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council can impose general 
obligations on the member states." 
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 3.3 Conclusions on the question on the adoption of abstract-
general norms and coherence with the Charter of the United 
Nations 
 
From the textual point of departure, it is clear that a single act of terrorism and a single 
act of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction might pose a ‘treat to the peace’. 
From the nature of the notion ‘threat to the peace’ it is clear that the Security Council 
might address such situations as well on a preventive basis.  
 
The question becomes more complex when it comes to the determination of these 
questions on a general basis as such. The notion ‘threat to the peace’ as such would 
arguably not be a hurdle for such a determination. The context of the notion sponsors a 
result where only concrete situations might b addressed, but taking the subsequent 
practice of the Security Council and the Member States into concert, the notion might 
encompass a larger variety of situations, or even phenomena.  
 
The notion ‘measures short of armed force’ is textually an open notion, negatively limited 
not to encompass the use of armed force. The list of measures found in the article itself 
would is not a complete list of measures, and the Security Council has got a wide margin 
of appreciation when it comes to determining which measures are necessary to put an end 
to the situation posing the ‘threat to the peace’. The measures available for the Security 
Council in order to remove the threat to the peace are closely interconnected with the 
existing ‘threat to the peace’ and it is clear that the notion ‘measures short of armed 
force’ opens for the Security Council to adopt binding resolutions with widespread 
implications when it responds to particular ‘threats to the peace’. Textually, the notion 
‘measures short of armed force’ does not prevent the Security Council from adopting 
resolutions containing simultaneously abstract, general and binding norms. However, the 
other measures found in Article 41 are measures suitable to respond to particular 
situations only, and the contextual result implies a limitation to the competences of the 
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Security Council. As well the systematic of the Charter leaves it doubtful whether the 
Security Council has got the competences to adopt simultaneously binding, abstract and 
general measures under Article 41 of the Charter. This is especially clear when one takes 
the contrast between the competences and the roles of the Security Council and the 
General Assembly into concern. As to the measures adopted in Resolution 1540, the 
systematic interpretation indicates that the Security Council might not regulate the 
armaments of the Member States, as this task is one of the General Assembly.159
 
In sum, it is from a textual, systematic and historic point of view doubtful if the Security 
Council might within it’s competencies given it in the Charter of the United Nations 
determine the phenomena of international terrorism as such and proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction as such as ‘threats to the peace’. Thus, is it doubtful if the Security 
Council might within its competencies adopt simultaneously binding, abstract and 
general resolutions,160 and thus is if doubtful if the Security Council within the Charter 
frames was in the possession of the competencies required to adopt Resolutions 1373 of 
2002 and 1540 of 2004.  
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 This opinion is probably shared by Frowein/Krisch, who after the adoption of Resolutions 1173 of 1998 
(regarding Nuclear tests performed by India and Pakistan) state that the contents of the resolution “might 
just be justified insofar as it responds to dangers arising from the specific circumstances of a case and, 
therefore, does not equal an attempt to regulate armaments in general”; Happold, page 606-607; Talmon, 
page 182: “the Council cannot impose general disarmament obligations on states, for example, by 
prohibiting the development, production or possession of a particular type of weaponry." 
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 See also Happold, page 599: “It is highly doubtful whether the Security Council is entitled to act under 
Chapter VII against a form of behaviour, rather than against a manifestation of that particular form of 
behaviour” and further on page 601: "Neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council can impose 
general obligations on the member states." 
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 4 
                                                
Dynamic-teleological interpretation of the 
competencies of the Security Council through 
the implied powers rule  
 
"Cessante ratio legis, cessat et ipsa lex"161
 
 
In this Chapter it will be discussed whether the United Nations Security Council on the 
basis of a teleological interpretation and especially through the implied powers rule was 
in the possession of the adequate competencies to adopt Resolutions 1373 of 2001 and 
Resolution 1540 of 2004 containing simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms.  
 
In discussing this matter, an important factor is the ‘constitutional’ character of the 
Charter. There are of course no clear-cut answers in this problematic, but the main views 
and their implications will be presented. Starting with the understanding of the Charter as 
a ‘constitution’ in the weaker sense of the notion and discussing the possible implications 
of this, it will be moved on to discussing the Charter as a ‘constitution’ in the stronger 
sense of the notion. After giving an interim conclusion to this, the consequences of any 
implied powers of the Security Council will be discussed. A conclusion will be given on 
the basis of the collected argumentation. Firstly, the concept of implied powers will be 
presented.  
 
 
 
161
 “If the reason for the law changes, then the law itself will have to change.” In: Reismann 2004, page 
909.  
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4.1 The implied powers rule 
 
The implied powers rule implies that the competencies and the powers of the Security 
Council are not exhaustively regulated in the Charter, and that its powers could be 
extended to areas not expressly found in the Charter.162 Such powers would be granted to 
the Security Council as were necessary to maintain the international peace and security.163  
 
The implied powers rule was clearly expressed in the International Court of Justice 
decision in the Reparations for Injuries Case in 1949 where the ICJ stated that the 
Organization – that is the United Nations – under international law must be “deemed to 
have those powers, which, though not expressly provided for in the Charter, are 
conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its 
duties.”164 As reasoning for this principle, the Court stated that it “could not be said that 
the Charter has left the Security Council impotent in the face of an emergency 
situation”.165
 
After this, there exists no doubt that the Security Council is in possession of some 
implied powers in exercising its powers under Chapter VII. What might be open for 
doubt is the exact nature and extent of these implied powers.166 In other words for the 
purposes of the present paper: does the implied powers open for the Security Council to 
adopt resolutions containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and general 
character? Is the possession of such powers necessary for the performance of the Security 
Councils obligations under the Charter? The answer to this is to a large extent dependent 
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 Arangio-Ruiz 1993, page 1. 
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 This is the main function of the Security Council under the Charter, UN-Charter Article 24, number 1 as 
well as it is a basic goal of the Untied Nations Organization as such, UN-Charter Article 1 number 1. 
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 ICJ Reparation for Injuries, 1949, page 182. See also ICJ Effect of Awards, 1954, page 56. The Court 
referred to this as a “principle of law”. 
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 Ibid, page 167.  
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 Similar argumentation was given by Judge Fitzmaurice, ibid, page 208.  
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upon which perspective is to behold in relation to the Charter of the United Nations: a 
‘constitution’ in the stronger sense of the notion or a ‘constitution’ in the weaker sense of 
the notion.167  
 
4.2 The Charter as a ‘constitution’ in the weaker sense of the 
notion 
 
The Charter of the United Nations is a constituent document of the international 
Organization of the Untied Nations, which makes the Charter of the United Nations a 
‘constitution’ in the weaker sense of the notion.168 This is the way the notion 
‘constitution’ is utilized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties,169 and the 
way International Court of Justice has utilized it. 170 This view implies that the Charter is 
only the ‘constitution’ of the United Nations Organization as such, and not of a 
community of society.171  
 
An implication of the Charter as a ‘constitution’ in the weaker sense of the notion is that 
the competencies of the Security Council, like the competencies of the other organs of the 
United Nations, must be interpreted in a dynamic-evolutionary manner,172 as the Charter 
                                                 
167
 Arrangio-Ruiz 2000, page 683: The doctrine of implied powers is “more or less directly interrelated 
with what we referred to at the outset as the constitutional (federal) theories of the Charter”. 
168
 The counterpoint to this is of course to view the Charter as a constitution for the community of world 
states from a national- or federal analogy, see part 4.3. 
169
 VCLT Art 5: “Treaties constituting international organizations (…) [t]he present Convention applies to 
any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization (…).” 
170
 The International Court of Justice qualifies charters of international organizations as “constitutions”. 
Ress, page 15; ICJ Reparation for Injuries, page 180 ff; ICJ Effects of Awards, page 57; ICJ Certain 
Expenses, page 167 ff.  
171
 Crawford, page 9-11; Happold, page 595.  
172
 One of the most infamous expressions of this the statement of Judge Alvarez in the Admissions Case: 
"The fact should be stressed that an institution, once established, acquires a life of its own, independent of 
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clearly is a very special international instrument. This would be in contrast to the 
traditional understanding of treaty interpretation173, after which the treaties shall be 
interpreted restrictively of care for their capacities to limit the sovereignty of the 
participating states.174  
 
The question of importance for the present paper is whether or not this dynamic-
evolutionary interpretation opens for the Security Council to adopt Resolutions 
containing simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms. An important argument 
here is the present need for a flexible interpretation of the Charter outside of the 
instruments for amendment itself provides for.175 The hurdles for any formal amendment 
of the Charter are so high that a formal change of the Charter at the present time is not 
likely.176 In favour of such competencies is existence of a basic need for the United 
Nations Organization to evolve in pace with any changes in the society surrounding it.177 
If the competencies of the Security Council were not subject to a dynamical 
                                                                                                                                                 
the elements which have given birth to it, and it must develop, not in accordance with the views of those 
who created it, but in accordance with the requirements of international life". Alvarez, Individual Opinion, 
ICJ Admissions, page 68; Schachter, page 118-119: "It must be kept in mind that the U.N. Charter can not 
be interpreted as a static text, but rather, due to the generality of its language and the broad range of 
Charter purposes, its interpretation is subject to change over time"; ICJ Namibia, page 31: "Moreover, a 
legal instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system 
prevailing at the time of interpretation."; Ress, page 16, margin number 3, and page 23 margin number 19 
ff. 
173
 Static-subjective interpretation, after which the interpretation is based on the meaning of the term at the 
time of conclusion of the treaty. Separate opinion of Judge Spender, ICJ Certain Expenses, on page 186: "A 
general rule is that words used in a treaty should be read as having the meaning they bore therein when it 
came into existence." 
174
 PCIJ, European Commission of the Danube, 1927, page 64. 
175
 UN-Charter Article 108 and 109.  
176
 See also Wagner, page 908. 
177
 Reisman 2004, page 909-910. 
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interpretation, this could make the Security Council less capable of filling its main 
obligation under the Charter: to maintain international peace and security.178  
 
Arguments contra an interpretation of the competencies of the Security Council to 
interpret its competencies to encompass the adoption of resolutions containing 
simultaneously binding, abstract and binding norms are both the fundamental principles 
of the Charter179 and the basic separation of powers between the organs of the United 
Nations Organization.180 The latter argument must be decisive for the conclusion that the 
Security Council from a dynamic-evolutionary view of the Charter of the United Nations 
as a ‘constitution’ in the narrower sense of the notion does not posses the competencies to 
adopt resolutions containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and general 
norms.   
 
The Charter of the United Nations is a ‘constitution’ in the weaker sense of the notion. It 
is, however, clear that it is a very special international instrument. Particular powers are 
given to particular branches of the organization even if there this is not clear-cut and 
there is no system of checks and balances.181 This has leaded some authors to promote the 
                                                 
178
 UN-Charter, Article 24.  
179
 Like the equal sovereignty of the Member States, Article 2 letter a.  
180
 As illuminated above in part 3.2. Happold page 595: “This is not to say that the Charter is anything 
more than the constitution of an organization, but it is to take the view that the Charter assigns particular 
roles to the various organs or the United Nations and that the powers of those organs are constrained by 
the roles assigned to them.”; White 2000, page 293-294, argues that although the Charter does not contain 
a system of checks and balances, it does include a "weak" form for separation of powers.   
181
 Happold page 595: “This is not to say that the Charter is anything more than the constitution of an 
organization, but it is to take the view that the Charter assigns particular roles to the various organs or the 
United Nations and that the powers of those organs are constrained by the roles assigned to them.”; White 
2000, page 293-294, argues that although the Charter does not contain a system of checks and balances, it 
does include a "weak" form for separation of powers.  
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Charter as a “living tree”, promoting the Charter as a highly vivid instrument of 
international law.182  
 
The “living tree”-theory implies that the Charter shall be interpreted highly dynamically. 
‘Constitutions’ – as well in the weaker sense of the notion – are designed to last for an 
indefinite time. The creators would have little possibility to foresee the changes in the 
individual- and in the world community. If the hurdles for amendment are too high, the 
dynamic interpretation poses the opportunity for the constitution to be a living part of the 
community and not contain mere “empty letters”. This theory would bring the results 
after an interpretation of the Charter as a constitution in the strong- and weak sense of the 
notion closer to each other. The weighing of the different arguments pro and contra 
implied powers to adopt resolution containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract 
and general contents as discussed below would thus apply here as well.  
 
                                                 
182
 Franck 2002, page 4. Similar and interrelated views are promoted under the labels of “more than a 
constitution in limited sense”, White, page 17; “constitutional-like character” (Verfassungsähnliche 
Charakter), Aston 2005, page 86 and “system of governance”. From the perception of the present writer, it 
seems that the Charter as a “living tree” is not dependent on a status of the Charter as a ‘constitution’ in the 
stronger sense of the notion. However, the arguments are to a large degree the same, so that it seems to be 
an alternative placed in the middle: constitution in the weak sense and but with far-reaching implications.  
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 4.3 The Charter of the United Nations as a ‘constitution’ in the 
stronger sense of the notion an the implications of this 
4.3.1 A constitution in the stronger sense? 
 
Clearly, all the Member States of the United Nations are sovereign states.183 When 
discussing if the Charter of the United Nations is a ‘constitution’ in the stronger sense of 
the notion,184 a positive answer to this would imply that the Member States have through 
its creation distributed some of their sovereignty to the international structure of the 
United Nations Organization.  
 
The United Nations Organization is neither a ‘super state’ nor a world government.185 
However, it is clear that the Charter is of extraordinary nature and that it holds a 
particular position in comparison with other international constituent treaties. The broad 
purposes of the Organization combined with its principles and its virtually universal 
membership186 gives indications hereof. The norms contained in it are of normative 
character.187 It might on the basis of these norms be discussed if the Charter in fact is a 
constitution of the international community. In the present paragraph, elements favouring 
and disfavouring a constitutional character of the Charter will be identified, described and 
attempted weighed against each other.188
                                                 
183
 This is a basic principle of the United Nations Organization, UN-Charter Article 2 number 1. 
184
 The notion is as well used by Crawford, page 11.  
185
 De Wet 2004, page 93; ICJ Certain Expenses page 157; ICJ Reparations for injuries, page 179. 
However, it might be discussed if the Security Council through competencies to adopt resolutions 
containing binding, abstract and general norms would lead to such a “super-state” status of the United 
Nations; see Happold, page 604. 
186
 The UN has 192 Member States, http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm#2000 
187
 De Wet page 95. 
188
 The factors regarded of importance for determining the constitutional character of the Charter vary with 
57 
 The main function of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and 
security.189 This maintenance-role might be compared with the role of the police190 in a 
national state. The Security Council is given broad powers to take effective, but 
preliminary,191 measures in acute situations, a role normally kept by a national police 
force. Furthermore, the police function of the Security Council lies implicit in the 
division of powers between it and the General Assembly.192 However, the Security 
Council has – unlike the national police force – got no obligation to respond to a ‘threat 
to the peace’193 and functions like a political organ.194  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the different authors on the subject: De Wet 2004, page 94: a normative character of the constitution, 
supremacy, inclusiveness, dynamic nature and separation of powers; Franck 2003, page 102: Pervasive 
perpetuity, indelibleness, primacy and institutional autochthony. Fassbender Col. 1998: Presents “features 
of the ideal constitution” recognizable in the Charter: a "constitutional moment", a system of governance, a 
definition of membership, a hierarchy of norms, "eternity"/amendment, "charter", constitutional history 
and universality. 
189
 UN-Charter Article 24 number 1 and Article 1 number 1.  
190
 See Koskenniemi 1995, page 337 ff; Frowein/Krisch page 705-706; Arangio-Ruiz page 723-724 limits 
the powers of the Council to “peace-enforcing” functions; Wood, page 78-79.  
191
 Frowein/Krisch page 705 margin number 13. 
192
 UN-Charter Article 11 and 13 contra Article  24.   
193
 De Wet 2004, page 110. 
194
 ICJ Congo/Uganda page 1111: The SC has got functions of a political nature.  
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Rudiments of separation of powers are found in the Charter of the United Nations.195 
Such a separation of powers would arguably be essential for a ‘constitution’ in the strong 
sense of the notion to exist,196 and would be a basic prerequisite for any system of checks 
and balances. The Security Council would in this system as discussed above be the 
“police”,197 however acting on political will and without obligation to act. The General 
Assembly would be the parallel to the national legislative body, endowed to tax and 
allocate money198 however, with no powers to adopt binding legislation. The International 
Court of Justice199 would be the parallel to the national Supreme Court, however with 
limited competencies200 and little possibilities to review the decisions of the other 
organs.201
                                                 
195
 ICJ Lockerbie, diss. op. Judge Weeramantry, page 165: "[a]s with the great branches of government 
within a domestic jurisdiction such as the executive and the judiciary, they perform their mission for the 
common benefit of the greater system of which they are part. In the United Nations system, the sphere of 
each of these bodies is laid down in the Charter, as within a domestic jurisdiction it may be laid down in a 
constitution." However, this is no true separation of powers from a national analogy; Fassbender Col. 1998, 
page 576. Crawford, page 11: "the absence of any notion of separation of powers". ICTY, in ILM 1996 
paragraph 43: "It is clear that the legislative, executive and judicial division of powers which is largely 
followed in most municipal systems does not apply to the international setting nor, more specifically, to ... 
the United Nations. Among the principal organs of the United Nations the divisions between judicial, 
executive and legislative functions are not clear cut." Furthermore: "It is clearly impossible to classify the 
organs of the United Nations into the above-discussed divisions which exist in the law of states." 
196
 However, not all national constitutional systems have constitutions in the strong sense of the notion, for 
example parliamentary systems. In these systems, there still exists some sort of division of checks and 
balances. See for example: Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 26 
August 1789, as quoted in Crawford page 12: "A society  in which the separation of powers [is] not clearly 
established, has no constitution." See Fassbender Col. 1998, pages 575-576. 
197
 See also Koskenniemi, page 337 ff. In his text the Security Council is the 'police', being responsible for 
the world order, and the General Assembly the 'temple', being responsible for matters of justice. 
198
 UN-Charter Article 17. 
199
 UN-Charter Chapter XIV. 
200
 The ICJ has no compulsory jurisdiction over international disputes, ICJ Statutes Article 36 (3). Its 
jurisdiction is limited to inter-state conflicts, ICJ Statutes Article 34.   
201
 ICJ Statutes Article 34. The Court may for example not control the contents or form of Security Council 
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 In Article 103 of the UN-Charter it is stated that the obligations of the Member States 
under the Charter shall prevail over their obligations under “any other international 
agreement” in the case of conflict.202 Arguably, this makes the norms found in the Charter 
the top level of an international hierarchy of norms.203 In a national state, the constitution 
would normally have supremacy over ordinary statute law.204 This is a strong argument 
favouring the constitutional character of the Charter.  
 
It might be argued that the Charter of the United Nations through its Secretariat205 
establishes an organization independent from the will of the Member States, which again 
would promote the Charter as ‘constitution’ in the strong sense of the notion.206 On the 
other side, the status of the UN Secretariat is not particularly strong compared to 
administrative instruments of other international organizations of a certain size.  
 
In sum, the present writer finds it difficult to describe the Charter of the United Nations 
as a constitution for the international community in the strong sense of the notion. There 
of course exist rudiments of what might be described as a separation of powers, but these 
are not far-going enough to establish the Charter of the United Nations as a ‘constitution’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
resolutions unless they are necessary to reach a conclusion in contentious disputes between Member States. 
Furthermore, the organs of the United Nations are the judge of their own competencies: ICJ Certain 
Expenses, page 168; Lamb, page 363; Sohn, page 203; Rosand, page 546. 
202
 In SC-Res. 1540 of 2004, operational paragraph 5, the Security Council particularly states that it shall 
not conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the existing treaty framework on area. 
It is, however, not clear that the Security Council in this way may surpass the Charter text. 
203
 Fassbender Col 1998, page 577 ff; ICJ Lockerbie, ICJ-Rep. 1992, pages 15 (paragraphs 39-41) and 126-
127 (paragraphs 42-44); SC-Resolutions 731 of 1992 and 748 of 1992.  
204
 Franck 2003, page 98: uses the notion primacy, which implies a domination of the proposed constitution 
among other legal instruments available to the community it serves. 
205
 UN-Charter, Article 97-101. 
206
 Franck page 100. 
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in the stronger sense of the notion. 207 The hard to classify powers of the Security Council 
enhances this fact,208 especially as the other organs of the Organization possess minimal 
possibilities to control the Security Council. However, arguments both pro and contra the 
United Nations Charter are convincing and any interim conclusion to the question is 
open.  
 
If one does view the Charter of the United Nations as a ‘constitution’ in the strong sense, 
this would imply greater powers endowed on the Security Council through the implied 
powers rule. The potential of this were potentially widespread. The question on whether 
or not competencies to adopt resolutions of binding, abstract and general contents are 
endowed on the Security Council might only be determined through holding the need for 
such competencies up against the implications of such.  
 
                                                 
207
 Fassbender Col. 1998, page 576. Crawford, page 11: "the absence of any notion of separation of 
powers". ICTY, Tadic Trials Chamber, paragraph 43: "It is clear that the legislative, executive and judicial 
division of powers which is largely followed in most municipal systems does not apply to the international 
setting nor, more specifically, to ... the United Nations. Among the principal organs of the United Nations 
the divisions between judicial, executive and legislative functions are not clear cut." Furthermore: "It is 
clearly impossible to classify the organs of the United Nations into the above-discussed divisions which 
exist in the law of states."; Arangio-Ruiz 1997, page 9: “the Charter is a mere inter-state compact”. De 
Wet, page 112 argues in the opposite direction; Simma, page 1117: “the Charter has become the 
constitution of the international community”; Franck 2003, page 99: The Charter “markedly simulates the 
requisites of a constitutive instrument” and on page 102: the Charter “more proximately relate to a 
constitution than to an ordinary contractual normative arrangement”. 
208
 This relates to the “quasi-judicative” and “quasi-legislative” powers of the Security Council. 
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 4.3.2 The need for the Security Council to adopt resolutions containing 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms to fulfil its 
obligations 
 
The Security Council has an important role to fulfil in the international community. 
Facing global, cross-border ‘threats to the peace’, the international community is 
arguably in need of a flexible organ capable of taking action.209 Arguably, as the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism could be 
described as ‘global threats’, which can only be fought with ‘global norms’:210 in other 
words abstract ‘threats’, which could only be fought with binding, abstract and general 
rules. 
 
If the implied powers rule would not allow for the Security Council to take action firstly, 
the hurdles211 built in the Charter were too high to make it likely that the Charter will be 
formally changed212 and secondly, the processes of multinational negotiating and 
ratifying would have taken too long to efficiently tackle the threats.213 If not given greater 
competencies, the Security Council might arguably find itself helpless facing the 
challenges of new threats.  
 
Arguably, competencies for the Security Council to adopt resolutions of simultaneously 
binding, abstract and general rules would be a benefit for the world community, giving it 
                                                 
209
 See the positive view of Szasz, page 905, arguing that a “legislative” function of the Security Council 
will open for centrally creating international law and for filling existing gaps in this.  
210
 Rosand, page 544. 
211
 UN-Charter Article 108, which necessitates firstly an adoption in the General Assembly with a two 
thirds majority and thereafter that this amendment is ratified by two thirds of the Member States, including 
all the permanent members of the Security Council.   
212
 Wagner, page 908.  
213
 Rosand, page 543-544; See also Szasz, page 905. 
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the possibility to centrally create norms on the international level and to fill existing gaps 
in existing treaty framework.214   
 
 
4.3.3 Potential implications of any implied powers to adopt resolutions 
containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and general 
contents 
 
Especially since the end of the cold war, the Security Council has extended its powers, 
both regarding the situations it might address, and regarding the measures it might decide 
on under Chapter VII. This is particularly clear regarding the determinations of what 
makes a ‘threat to the peace’: from the very strict understanding expressed in the Spanish 
Question215 to an understanding not only involving inter-state conflicts but furthermore 
cases regarding inner- and regional conflicts,216 humanitarian crisis,217 the lack of 
democracy218 and financial crisis.219  
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 Szasz, page 905. 
215
 See above, part 3.2. 
216
 Somalia: SC-Res. 733 and 794, 1992;  
217
 SC-Res. 688 of 1991: “Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population (…), which 
led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions 
which threaten international peace and security in the region” and further the Security Council was 
“[d]eeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved”
217
; Österdahl, page 46 promotes the 
importance of the humanitarian for the adoption of the Resolution 688 of 1991. In the cases of Somalia and 
Rwanda, the Security Council made it clear that the human tragedy caused by the conflicts were ‘threats to 
the peace’: SC-Res. 794 of 1992: “Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the 
conflict in Somalia (…), constitutes a threat to international peace and security”; SC-Res. 929 of 1994: 
“Determining that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and 
security in the region”. In the case of Eastern Zaire the far-reaching violations of human rights presented a 
‘threat to the peace’: SC-Res. 1078 of 1996. 
218
 The Security Council has opened for viewing the lack of democracy or coups against democratic chosen 
governments as threats to the peace. In SC-Res. 940 of 1994 and SC-Res. 1529 and 1542 of 2004, the 
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 A clear expression of this change in perception is might be observed in the statement of 
the president of the Security Council made in 1992: “The absence of war and military 
conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The 
non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological 
fields have become threats to international peace and security.”220  
 
As illuminated above in part 2.3.3, the Security Council has on occasions adopted 
resolutions of abstract and general content, however, without adopting norms binding on 
the Member States. In some resolutions it has, however, gone one step further and has 
determined certain phenomena potential ‘threats to the peace’.221 The phenomena posing 
a potential ‘threat to the peace’ as such are These are for example the deliberate targeting 
of civilian populations222, including children223, violation of international humanitarian 
                                                                                                                                                 
Security Council determined the situation on Haiti a threat to the peace. However, it made it clear that the 
competencies of the Security Council is dependent on the circumstances in the individual conflict: SC-Res. 
940, 1994. “Recognizes the unique character of the present situation in Haiti and its deteriorating, 
complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an exceptional response”. 
219
 In the Case of Albania, the financial situation, leading to instability und violence was characterized a 
‘threat to the peace’: SC-Res. 1101 and 1114 of 1997. 
220
 Heads of State and Government Summit, Security Council meeting number 3046, Statement by the 
President, in YUN, 1992, page 34. The range of this comment is hotly discussed in the judicial literature; 
see Aston 2005, page 275; Frowein/Krisch, page 720, margin number 6; Österdahl, page 19. Koskenniemi, 
page 326 asks “Was it [the Security Council] in fact making a charte blanche declaration on the 
limitlessness of its powers?” Contextually, the Council stated further: “The United Nations membership 
working as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the 
solution of these matters.” (ibid, page 34). This might imply a limitation of the range of the statement. 
221
 Though without acting under Chapter VII.  
222
 SC-Res. 1296 of 2000, operational paragraph 5.  
223
 SC-Res. 1314 of 2001, operational paragraph 9: “the deliberate targeting of civilian populations (…) 
including children, and the committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law, including that relating to children, in situations of armed conflict may 
constitute a threat to international peace and security”.  
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and human rights law224 the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons225 and the 
pandemic of HIV and AIDS.226 This might arguably express a tendency – or at least a will 
– of the Council to broaden its competencies. 
 
The existence of any competencies to adopt resolutions containing norms of 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents has potentially great implications. 
The Council has pointed at the close connection between international terrorism and trans 
national organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking and 
illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological or other potential deadly materials,227 
all phenomena it would thinkable desirable to address on an abstract basis to fight.  
 
In the literature it has been suggested that the Council adopt resolutions relating to 
violations of the friendly relations between states, disarmament and arms control.228 It 
could be thinkable to develop the provisions of resolution 1540 further, for example by 
defining the possessing of biological or chemical weapons a ‘threat the peace’ and as 
such and thereafter prohibit them, not only for terrorist entities and non-state actors but as 
well for states.229 Furthermore, any nuclear explosion would arguably constitute a ‘threat 
to the peace’.230 Thinkable were as well be for the Council to respond to threats of cross-
boundary pollution or distribution of limited resources.  
                                                 
224
 Ibid. 
225
 SC-Res. 1209 of 1998, operational paragraph 1: the excessive accumulation and circulation of small 
arms and light weapons in Africa threaten national, regional and international security. 
226
 SC-Res. 1308 of 2000, preamble paragraph 11: if it remains unchecked, the pandemic of HIV and AIDS 
might pose a threat to international peace and security.  
227
 SC-Res 1373 of 2001, operational paragraph 4: similar in SC-Res. 1456 of 2003, preamble: Organized 
crime, illicit drugs and drug trafficking, money-laundering and illicit arms trafficking. It was in both 
resolutions stressed that terrorists must be prevented from using these other criminal activities for their 
terrorist purposes. 
228
 Szasz 2002, page 904. 
229
 See also Aston, page 112;Tomuschat RdC 1993, page 241. 
230
 See also Szasz 2002, page 904. 
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 Such scenarios would clearly be mere speculations. However, already before the adoption 
of resolutions 1373 and 1540 and before the adoption of resolution 1172, it was 
speculated if the Security Council might declare that certain types of weapons per se 
constitute a threat to the peace and that it thereby might forbid or limit them.231 It was 
argued that the Security Council might venture into developing a subject-matter-specific 
understanding of article 39 and determine, for instance, that certain types of armaments 
constitute per se a threat to international peace and security.232 This has of course proved 
right. The Security Council has in some of its resolutions addressing abstract phenomena 
stated its intention to “consider imposing targeted and graduated measures”.233
 
Certain parallels might arguably be drawn from the development on the area of 
international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: The Security 
Councils response to international terrorism might be described in three stages:234 firstly, 
the single acts of terrorism are condemned, and resolutions are made towards concrete 
states.235 Secondly, the international terrorism condemned on a general basis.236 Thirdly, 
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 Ibid, page 901; Szasz 1995, page 62. 
232
 Thomuschat RdC 1993, page 344 ff: "The Security Council could venture to develop a subject-matter-
specific understanding of Article 39, determining, for instance, that certain types of armaments - like the 
production and stockpiling of biological weapons - constitute per se a threat to international peace and 
security (...) the Security Council may act not only as an executive agency that enforces the provisions of 
the Charter in individual chases, it also has the power to issue 'secondary legislation' with a view to 
preventing concrete, actual threats from arising. The main fields of application of this power can be arms 
regulation and disarmament as well as protection of the environment." (Prof. Tomuschat was obviously 
ahead of his time) ; Müller, page 54. 
233
 SC-Res. 1539 of 2004, operational paragraph 5 letter c; SC-Res. 1612 of 2005, operational paragraph 9. 
234
 The separating lines between these stages are of course blurring, general statements are for example 
made in resolutions responding to concrete situations.  
235
 Lockerbie/Libya: SC-Res. 731 of 21 January 1992; SC-Res. 748 of 31 March 1992; SC-Res. 883 of 11 
November 1993: “Convinced also that the suppression of acts of international terrorism (…) is essential 
for the maintenance of international peace and security”; See also SC-Res. 1189 of 13 August 1998. 
236
 SC-Res. 1269 of 19 October 1999, operational paragraph 1: “Condemning all acts of terrorism, 
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binding resolutions for the phenomena international terrorism, applicable on all 
manifestations of the phenomena.237 On the area of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, the phenomenon has been addressed on general basis from an early stage238 
before Resolution 1540 was adopted. This step-by-step process could imply that the steps 
would be shorter for the Security Council to adopt binding, abstract and general 
Resolutions if the phenomenon is firstly addressed on a non-binding basis. Such non-
binding abstract and general resolutions are made on several areas239, and in some of 
these the Security Council went as far as to state that the phenomena “might” pose a 
threat to the international peace and security.240
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
irrespective of motive, wherever and by whomever committed”; and in the preamble paragraph 8: ”the 
suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are involved, is an essential 
contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security”; Security Council Presidential 
statement after meeting at level heads of state and government S/2350 of 31 January 1992, page 3; SC-Res 
1269 of 1999: “Emphasizing the necessity to intensify the fight against terrorism at the national level and 
to strengthen (…) effective international cooperation in this field” and furthermore “[r]eaffirming that the 
suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are involved, is an essential 
contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security”. From these statements it is only a 
small step to declare “all acts of international terrorism” as a threat to international peace and security; 
Krisch, page 882. 
237
 Or more precisely: mainly the financing leading up to the international terrorism. SC-Res. 1373 of 2001.  
238
 Presidential Statement of 31 January 1992 (S/2350), page 4: "[t]he proliferation of all weapons of mass 
destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security". Repeated: S/PRST/1996/17, paragraph 
4 of the statement; S/PRST/1998/12 paragraph 4. The step to the general statement in SC-Res 1172 of 
1998, preamble paragraph 2 was perhaps smaller.  
239
 See part 2.3.3 above. 
240
 These are: The deliberate targeting of civilian populations: SC-Res. 1296 of 2000, operational paragraph 
5; the deliberate targeting of civilians including children: SC-Res. 1314 of 2000, operational paragraph 9; 
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa: SC-Res. 1209 of 1998, operational paragraph 
1; the pandemic of HIV and AIDS if remained unchecked: SC-Res. 1308 of 2000, preamble paragraph 1; 
widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed 
conflict;1296 of 2000, operational paragraph 5.s 
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4.3.4 Conclusions on the Charter as a ‘constitution’ in the strong sense 
and the implications of this  
 
Even from the perspective of the United Nations Charter as a ‘constitution’ in the 
stronger sense of the notion, it should be kept in mind that if the Member States wanted 
to give the Security Council competencies to adopt resolutions containing simultaneously 
binding, abstract and general norms, these powers should after the system of the Charter 
be endowed on the Council through a formal amendment of the Charter. Application of 
the implied powers rule should arguably be reserved to only highly exceptional cases 
where the performance of the most essential tasks of the organization is at stake.241  
 
On the other side, it might be argued that not such a high degree of necessity is required, 
as the Security Council is, like any organ of the United Nations in the first instance judge 
of its own legality.242 This finds support in the more functionalist view expressed in the 
Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion.243 Arguably, the threats of international terrorism 
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are threatening the international peace 
and security on a global level, which necessitates responses of global applicability, like 
norms of simultaneously abstract, general and binding contents.  
 
The Charter is subject to limited government as inherent in the notion ‘constitution’.244 
This requires any constitutional interpretation to be practised with caution.245 When the 
Security Council interprets its competencies, this must me done strictly within the legal 
sub-system, that is: within the frames of the United Nations Charter.246  
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The principle of sovereign equality247 of the Member States is a basic principle of the 
United Nations, which is binding on the Security Council in the performance of its 
duties.248 This principle would arguably be hard to unite with powers for the Security 
Council to adopt resolutions containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and 
general contents.249 In the same direction pulls the argument of basal separation of powers 
between the General Assembly and the Security Council, which would prevent the latter 
adopting simultaneously abstract, general and binding norms.  It was stated by the ICTY 
that the Security Council“is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however 
broad its powers under the constitution might be"250 and further, that the powers of the 
Security Council “cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the 
Organization at large, nor to mention other specific limitations or those which may 
derive from the internal division of power within the Organization”. 251
 
In sum, the best reasons favour the solution that the implied powers rule does not open 
for the Security Council to adopt resolutions containing norms of simultaneously binding, 
abstract and general contents. This is particularly clear taking the potentially widespread 
implications of implied powers to adopt resolutions of simultaneously binding, abstract 
and general contents into concern. However, the conclusion must be regarded as an open 
one, with strong arguments sponsoring the both alternatives.  
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 4.4 Conclusion on dynamic-teleological interpretation of the 
competencies of the Security Council through the implied 
powers rule 
 
As seen above, the intensity of the flexibility of the interpretation of the Charter will to a 
large degree be dependent on whether or not one views the Charter as a ‘constitution’ in 
the strong sense of the notion. There are of course. If one views the Charter of the United 
Nations as a ‘constitution’ of the world community in the stronger sense of the notion, 
this would imply wider purposes and therefore open for wider powers implied to it. On 
the other hand, if one views the Charter as a ‘constitution’ of the world community in the 
weaker sense of the notion, the range of powers implied to the Security Council would be 
narrower.  
 
The conclusion on the question on the Charter as a ‘constitution’ in the strong sense 
remains open. If one were to come to the conclusion that the Charter is a ‘constitution’ in 
the strong sense, this would under no circumstances open for the Security Council to take 
any measure of any character at will. Weighed up against the major implications such 
competencies the Council would have in performing such duties a restrictive 
interpretation would be advisable as well here.  
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Subsequent practice and implementation 
5.1 Introduction to the subsequent practice approach 
 
The subsequent practice of the treaty parties is – as any mean of dynamic interpretation 
of the Charter – of importance because it is unlikely that the Charter of the United 
Nations will be formally revised or amended in the nearest future252 and because new 
threats create new needs for the fields of practice of the United Nations to expand. 
Another aspect of giving legal relevance to the subsequent practice of the Organization 
and its members is that this reduces the possibility of ultra vires action of the United 
Nations.253  
 
The Vienna Convention of the law of Treaties establishes as a general rule of 
interpretation that “[t]here shall be taken into account (…) any subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation”254. Although all the Member States of the United Nations have not yet 
ratified the VCLT, and even though the convention is only directly applicable on treaties 
concluded subsequent to the VCLT entry into force in 1980, the rules of interpretation 
found in the VCLT are part of international customary law.255  
 
The International Court of Justice already in the Reparation for Injuries Advisory 
Opinion in 1949 made it clear that the subsequent practice might be of importance for the 
interpretation of the provisions in the Charter.256 The practice of the United Nations 
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organs and the practice of the Member States are important elements in specifying and 
developing the Charter provisions.257 The subsequent practice of both the treaty parties 
and of the organs of the Organization is a necessary and autonomous element of 
interpretation in a dynamic-objective interpretation of the Charter,258 establishing a 
dynamic consensus based upon the organizational purpose.259  
 
The different sources to knowledge of subsequent practice are different for the Security 
Council and for the Member States. Of main relevance for the practice of the Security 
Council are clearly its adopted resolutions and the practice of the CTC and the 1540 
Committee. The main sources of relevance for the subsequent practice of the Member 
States are for the purposes of the present paper officially given statements and reports to 
the CTC and the 1540 Committee.  
 
Of relevance would of course be both practice relating to the interpretation of the notion 
‘threat to the peace’ and the encompassing of abstract phenomena as well as the practice 
relating to the adoption of simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents.260  
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 5.2 Practice of the Security Council  
 
The Council itself obviously considered the adoption of both the Resolutions 1373 and 
1540 intra vires, an observation particularly clear when the statements made by the 
permanent members of the Security Council before and at its adoption.261  
 
As to the field of application of its competencies, the Security Council has through its 
resolutions subsequent to Resolution 1373 and 1540 made it clear that it repeatedly 
considers the phenomena of international terrorism and of proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction a ‘threat to the peace’. Such statements were given on two occasions 
prior to the adoption of the Resolutions 1373 and 1540.262  
 
Furthermore, the Security Council has, as described above in part 4.3.3 on several 
occasions addressed certain phenomena as ‘threats to the peace’ or potential ‘threats to 
the peace’.263 Such resolutions and statements show that the Security Council 
continuously understands itself as competent to address and potentially respond to 
abstract phenomena.264
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 5.2.1 Particularly on the Counter Terrorism Committee 
 
In reviewing the practices of the Security Council, it must be identified with its helping 
organs265 in order to describe the Councils determination on the question. Thus, the 
practice of the Counter Terrorism Committee gives guidelines to the subsequent practice 
of the Security Council. The Counter Terrorism Committee is an organ that strengthens 
the executive capacity of the Security Council, for which reasons its practices are 
particularly relevant for interpreting the Security Councils view on different questions. 
As a subordinate organ, the CTC reports to the Security Council and answers to this. 
 
The main obligation of the Counter Terrorism Committee is to monitor the 
implementation of Resolution 1373.266 In the practice, however, it has gone over these 
duties and offers assistance to the Member States on the implementation, gives comments 
on these reports. It functions as a link between different international counter terrorism 
organs and has established contact with a wide range of international organizations. The 
Committee provides the Member States with technical assistance267 and has started to 
develop standards of best practice.268 The Counter Terrorism Committee has become the 
hub of a global, long-term effort to combat terrorism269 through building capacity and 
sharing information and is far more active than any committee previously set up by the 
Security Council.270   
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The strategic and political decisions of the CTC are still taken by a plenary consisting of 
the members of the Security Council.271 In 2003 the CTC consisted of 10 experts, of 
which eight were concerned with reviewing the reports of the Member States.272 That is, 
eight persons to review the received reports, which reached more than 300 in 2003. In 
comparison there are 20 experts employed in the new Information and Administrative 
Office.  
 
In 2004, the Counter Terrorism Committee went through a process of “revitalization”273. 
Included in this process is the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Executive 
Directorate (CTED), 274 which is separated in the Assessment and Technical Assistance 
Office (ATAO)275 and the Information and Administrative Office (IAO)276. The CTED 
has got extended competencies compared to those of the CTC, for example may the 
CTED visit the different Member States to control on the implementation of Resolution 
1373277 and shall visit selected countries “to enhance the full and effective 
implementation of the measures“.278
 
It might be argued that the Counter Terrorism Committee is now in the position of an 
international administrative organ.279 The Security Council gives the organ a great 
responsibility and a great trust from the Council. The process of revitalization and the 
establishment of the CTED show the Security Councils determination on the area.  
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In Resolution 1566 of 8 October 2004, the Security Council reaffirmed that every act of 
international terrorism posed a threat to international peace and security, and in the 
operational paragraph recalled a definition of terrorism.280 This further promotes the 
Security Councils determination on the area. The lack of a definition of terrorism has 
been a source of much critique.  
 
 
5.2.2 Weight of the practice of the Security Council 
 
 
The Resolutions 1373 and 1540 both are subsequent practice in the terms of the 
VCLT,281 and implies that the Security Council itself interprets its competencies to 
encompass as well the adoption of simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms. 
The subsequent practice of the Security Council is of importance for the interpretation of 
the Charter provisions both as a manifestation of the current consensus amongst its 
members as well as it might serve as a starting point for a discussion on the consistency 
with the Charter.282 It might be argued that the far most important legal source to 
interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations is the practice of the Organs of the 
Organization itself.283 The Security Council influences the development of international 
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law by its resolutions under Chapter VII. On questions regarding international peace and 
security – the core areas of the competences of the Security Council – the uniform 
practice of the permanent Security Council members comes close to being relevant 
practice in the meaning of the VCLT.284 In the ICJ Namibia-case, the particular weight of 
the practice of the permanent Members of the Security Council was promoted.285  
 
The Security Council is of course not a representative organ, with its decisions supported 
immediately only by 15 Member States. However, it is clear that the subsequent practice 
of the Security Council could be of great importance for the interpretation of the Charter. 
The best-known example for subsequent practice evolving into a generally accepted 
agreement on the interpretation of the Charter provisions is the interpretation of Article 
27 number 3 of the Charter. In its practice, the Security Council has seen it adequately for 
the Permanent Member of the Security Council to be present when votes are taken and 
accepted that votes might be withheld without taking this as a use of the right of veto. 
This procedure has been consistent since 1965 and has been generally accepted by the 
Member States.286  
 
The Security Council is in the first instance the judge of its own legality.287 This makes 
its practice an important element for the interpretation of its competences under the 
United Nations Charter. The practice of the Security Council itself is of particular 
importance as a part of an evolutionary interpretation of the Charter as the constituent 
document of the United Nations Organization.288
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It is argued that the cumulative actions of the Security Council might reflect the opinio 
juris in the international community of states289 and that resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council can become a meaning that goes over the cumulated practice of the 
states represented in the Security Council.290 The value of this, however, is limited:291 The 
Security Council is as organ established to respond to particular, acute situations. Its 
procedures, subjecting the Council to time constraints and pressure, are not made to 
warrant the needs of the world community or to create norms of general applicability.  
 
On the other side, it might be argued that the purposes of the United Nations is such an 
important element for the interpretation that the will of the parties is derogated to an 
almost subsidiary means of interpretation,292 an argument, which promotes the 
autonomous interpretation by the organs of the Organization.  
 
The Security Council bases its resolutions on a majority vote.293 The practice of an organ 
based on the majority principle may arguably only be regarded as unanimous member 
State practice when only an insignificant number of (Member) States objects to the 
adoption.294  
 
Clearly, the practice of the Security Council does not represent the collective will of the 
Member States, but mere the Organ itself and the Member States represented in it.295 A 
resolution by the Security Council is dependent some explicit acceptance in order to 
imply changes in the powers of the Security Council. 296 This makes the weight of the 
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argument of subsequent practice of the Security Council dependent on the subsequent 
practice of the Member States. 
 
It has been argued that the weight of the Security Council Resolutions is mere that similar 
to the Friendly Relations Declaration of the General Assembly "provided that their 
subject-matter is not restricted to particular situations".297 If this were a correct 
observation, this would imply that the resolutions containing simultaneously binding, 
abstract and general norms because of their general contents.  
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 5.3 Subsequent practice of- and implementation by the Member 
States 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
The adoption of resolutions containing simultaneously binding, abstract and general 
norms is arguably after the discussion above ultra vires.298 The Member States might 
though through its subsequent practice have healed this.  
 
When the Security Council submits an innovative interpretation of its own powers by 
declaring situations ‘threats to the peace’, the community of states will accept or decline 
this innovative interpretation of the Charter.299 In this way, the dynamic of the Charter is 
fully exploited only through collaboration between the Security Council and the Member 
States, making the practice of the Security Council and the implementation by the 
Member States function closely interconnected.  
 
The subsequent practice of the Member States might be expressed both through formal 
statements made in connection with the adoptions of the Resolutions and in later 
discussions, through co-operation with the Counter Terrorism Committee and the 
Committee established with Resolution 1540 as well as through domestic implementation 
of the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 and through ratification of the international treaties on 
the area. 
 
As to the latter point, there are 13 main international instruments on the area of counter 
terrorism, which the Security Council has encouraged the Member States to ratify. From 
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being subject to a minimal number of ratifications at the time of adoption of Resolution 
1373, these instruments were in March 2006 ratified in between 116300 and 183301 
Member States.302
 
 
5.3.2 Particularly on reporting to the Counter Terrorism Committee 
 
Resolution 1373 of 2001 was adopted rapidly after the incidents in the United States of 
11 September the same year, and was not subject to any formal debate with members 
outside of the Security Council before it was adopted.303 For this reason, reports to the 
CTC become an even more important source of knowledge.  
 
The implementation of the Resolution 1373 has progressed well. The Secretary General 
of the United Nations has stated: “The work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and 
the cooperation it has received from the Member States have been unprecedented and 
exemplary.”304 By the end of May 2003, all the Member States had submitted a first 
report on their implementation of the Resolution.305 By August 2004, more than 500 
reports had been submitted in four rounds of reporting.306 The majority of states have 
submitted more reports, responding to letters received from the Chairman of the Security 
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Council.307 However, the intensity of the reporting has not been at the same level in all 
the states,308 and the implementation of Resolution 1373 has been a source of concern for 
the Security Council. This was expressed in Resolution 1456 of 20 January 2003, as the 
Council stressed the obligation on States to report to the CTC according to the timetable 
set by the CTC and furthermore called on the states to respond to the Committees 
requests for information.309  
 
In April 2003, it had been presented 351 reports from 188 states, and only three states had 
not yet provided first reports.310 However, 41 States had not provided the requested 
second reports and eight states had failed to deliver third reports.311 In October 2003, all 
Member States had filed reports.312 However, 26 were late in submitting their second 
report and 31 late in submitting their third report. In May 2004, 32 member states were 
late in submitting their second report, 29 late in submitting their third report and 10 late 
on submitting their fourth report.313 In December 2004, 31 Member States were late on 
submitting their second report, 34 late on submitting their third report and 10 late on 
submitting their fourth report.314
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 The Counter Terrorism Committee has for capacity reasons separated the prerequisites to 
states reports in three stages.315 In the first stage, stage A, the Committee shall monitor in 
how far the Member States have the adequate legislation to cover all the aspects of 
Resolution 1373. Furthermore, they shall become part to all the 12 international counter 
terrorism conventions and protocols.316
 
The stages of the work of the Counter Terrorism Committee are not coherent with the 
number of reports presented by the individual Member State. That is to say: the first 
report indeed directs itself to the stage A, but so does as well the second and third reports. 
As the Committee has received the first set of reports, it composes a list of questions in a 
letter sent back to the Member State. The State’s answers to these questions then 
compose the second reports, in which the Committed monitors that all states regard the 
requirements of stage A.317 The reviews of the states practices will probably continue 
until the factors in stage A are fulfilled before moving on to reviewing the further 
stages.318  
 
In the stage B, the Counter Terrorism Committee shall focus on in how far the Member 
States have an effective coordinated executive organization for implementing Resolution 
1373, police and intelligence structures as well as immigration- and border controls.319 
The stage C is the stage in which the Committee shall examine the implementation of 
Resolution 1373 in the States, implying that the Member States shall possess the 
legislative and executive machinery to fill their obligations on the justice and on bilateral, 
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regional and international cooperation. Furthermore, the states shall cooperate judicially 
and share information.320 So far, few or none state have reached Stage C in their reports.  
 
 
5.3.3 Particularly on the practice regarding Resolution 1540  
 
In contrast to the adoption of Resolution1373, the Security Council invited Member 
States to take part in public hearings or ‘conversations’ before it adopted Resolution 1540 
in 2004.321 In these ‘conversations’, a line of Member States expressed doubt in 
‘legislative competences’ of the Security Council.322 The view that the Security Council 
was not satisfactory representative to adopt a resolution with such widespread 
implications was expressed,323 as well as the view that the Resolution would undermine 
the balance between the Security Council and the General Assembly.324 It was pointed to 
the widespread implications of the Resolution for the national legislature for the instance 
of non-compliance,325 and was warned against an accumulation of functions and powers 
in the Security Council.326 Pakistan – a non-permanent member of the Council at the 
moment – though expressed that the “Security Council cannot assume the stewardship of 
global non-proliferation and disarmament issues.”327
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Some states demanded that the Security Council should limit its ‘legislative 
competences’ to extraordinary situations,328 and promoted the dependence on 
international consensus.329 Concerns were expressed that the Resolution 1540 would 
become a precedent.330 The view of the Resolution as a mere interim solution was 
expressed,331 as well as the need for the Security Council to act cautious not to 
undermine the stability of the international legal framework.332  
 
However, a great amount of States expressed more positive views to the adoption of the 
Resolution.333 It was stated that it would be “entirely appropriate [for the SC to adopt 
Resolution 1540], consistent with its mandate to maintain international peace and 
security.”334 It was in particular focused on the urgent need to adopt such regulations and 
on how the normal procedures of adopting international treaties would be too slow too 
efficiently respond to the treat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,335 
promoting the Security Councils “leadership in addressing a new challenge”.336  
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It was argued that when Resolution 1373 could be adopted within the frames of Chapter 
VII, this as well had to be the case for a resolution with the goal of preventing 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist entities.337 Some states focused 
on the importance of adopting the resolution under Chapter VII in order to show the 
determination of the Security Council in the matter.338 Subsequent to the adoption of 
Resolution 1540, the critical voices were however more or less gone; only India gave a 
formal statement, in which it repeated the previously expressed reservations to the 
adoption of the resolution. 
 
In July 2005, more than a year after the adoption of Resolution 1540, it was clear that 74 
states – almost 40 percent of the Member States – still had not reported on their 
implementation of the Resolution.339 The contents of this report should mere be on the 
steps the states have taken or intend to take to implement the resolution.340
 
The Member States shall report on their implementation of the resolution 1540 to a 
Monitoring Committee established through the Resolution.341 The existence of this is 
however limited to a period of two years.342 As in Resolution 1373, the Member States 
were called upon to report to this committee on their implementation of the Resolution no 
later than six months form the adoption of the resolution.343
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As per 1. August 2006, 132 Member States and the European Union has submitted 
reports to the 1540 Committee.344 This of course implies that there are still – two years 
after the adoption of Resolution 1540, still 60 Member States who have yet to report to 
the committee.345 Furthermore, the intensity of the reporting is not very high.346
 
 
5.3.4 Weight of the practice of- and the implementation by the Member 
States 
 
The extent of the implementation of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 in the Member States is 
of great importance for the development of the competences of the Security Council. 
Unless the Resolutions actually influence actual behaviour they remain no more than 
verbal admonitions and their presumed obligatory character merely nominal.347 In order 
to produce changes in the competences of the Council under the Charter, additional 
elements of state practice are required.348 Thus, in order for the Security Council to 
expand its competences to encompass adoption of resolutions containing norms of 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents, it would be required that the 
resolutions are implemented in the Member States.349  
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 The legal weight of the implementation in the Member States might though arguably be 
dubious. In the cases for the International Court of Justice where practice of organs of the 
United Nations Organization or of its Member States has been emphasised, the ICJ has 
with one exception promoted that the result gained from the practice as well would have 
been achieved by other means of interpretation.350  
 
In how far the reporting to the committees shows the real picture of the national situation 
might sometimes be doubtful.351  Furthermore, the fulfilment of their obligations to report 
to the CTC and the 1540 Committee does not necessarily represent a consensus in the 
Member States. There are two sides to this. Firstly, resolutions adopted under Chapter 
VII are binding on the Member States, a fact, which makes the weight of the 
implementation of the Resolutions somewhat dubious. Arguably, compliance with 
binding resolutions is sub-standard to the compliance with non-binding resolutions.352 
When the resolutions are biding, implementation of these does not necessarily represent a 
consensus among the Member States, but could as well represent the mere obligation to 
implement the resolution.353 The lack of efficient review of Security Council Resolutions 
might lead the Member States to fear enforcement of as well ultra vires resolutions as 
                                                                                                                                                 
can thus be considered to reflect the global balance of political interests." 
350
 Ress, page 30, margin number 33. This exception is the Namibia- advisory opinion, It was emphasised 
that “the positions taken by members of the Council, in particular its permanent members, have 
consistently and uniformly interpreted the practice”. ICJ Namibia, 1971, page 22. 
351 Politic is as well an important part of the reporting, something the first report supplied by the Iraqi 
government (S/2001/1291) shows: “Iraq is the foremost victim of terrorism ... terrorists that receive 
patronage, training, financing and armament within a framework of State terrorism ... One such State is the 
United States of America, which openly spends tens of millions of dollars on troops of mercenaries to carry 
out terrorist operations against Iraq pursuant to what is referred to as the ‘Iraq Liberation Act’”.  
352 Ress, page 28, margin number 29. "If the organ's competence to interpret is binding, the practice in 
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 See Zimmermann/Elberling, page 74: “Jedoch muß die Tatsache, daß ein Staat einen solchen Bericht 
erstattet nicht notwendig bedeuten, daß er damit auch die Rechtsgrundlage für eine entsprechende 
Verpflichtung anerkennt.” Similar: Klein, page 104.  
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ordinary resolutions. The actual obedience will for these reasons give no completely true 
picture of the Member States opinion on the legality of the Security Council Resolutions.  
 
Secondly, both resolutions 1373 and 1540 fill important gaps in international legislation. 
The majority – if not all – of the Member States have a great interest in a stop of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a stop to international terrorism. 
Implementation of the Resolutions might very well be found in the own interest of the 
state to put an end to the phenomena and does not necessarily prove an acceptance of a 
competence for the Security Council to adopt resolutions of simultaneously binding, 
abstract and general contents.354  
 
Both the binding character of the resolutions and the interests of the states to fight the 
phenomena limit the weight of the implementation of the Resolutions, at least regarding 
the weight of the Resolutions as predicates for resolutions to come. Implementation of the 
provisions of Resolutions 1373 and 1540 does not with necessity imply an acceptance for 
the legal basis for adopting the Resolutions, in other words, does not necessarily imply 
acceptance for any general competence for the Security Council to adopt resolutions of 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents.  
 
As to the ratification of resolutions on the counter-terrorism area, the Security Council 
only called upon the Member States to become parties to these. If the Member States 
follow non-mandatory resolutions by the Security Council this might be a more 
trustworthy sign of compliance than any compliance with binding parts of the 
resolutions.355 On the other side, the compliance with these resolutions will not give us 
information to the acceptance of the Security Councils competencies to adopt resolutions 
containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents as this 
compliance refers to norms of a non-binding character.  
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In the process of adopting Resolution 1540, most western states were positive to the 
adoption of the Resolution, whereas the members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
were more critical of the role the adoption of this resolution would give the Council.356 It 
seems though that there was a general scepticism to “legislative powers” of the Security 
Council,357 which again would imply scepticism to a general admissibility to adopt 
resolutions containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents.  
 
The comments made in the discussions before the adoption of Resolution 1540 are 
arguably not definite reactions to the competencies of the Security Council. Arguably, the 
comments were made with the intention of making views of the States known to the 
Security Council before the adoption of the Resolution perhaps in hope that this would 
influence the contents of the adopted resolution.358 The statements were arguably not 
intended as formal declarations on acceptance or refusal of the resolution.359
 
Statements made before and after the adoption of the Resolution 1540 might give a more 
valid indication on the acceptance in the Member States.360 From this might arguably the 
conclusion be drawn that the Member States accepted the resolution and its 
implications.361
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As to the statements made in the phase preliminary to Resolution 1540, where some 
states stated that the powers of the Security Council should be limited to only exceptional 
situations, 362 this expresses a wish not to be bound under international law on decisions 
the Member States might formally not influence. Binding character of the resolutions, 
adopted in a process the Member States might not influence, is though the basis character 
of Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII. These comments must be of limited weight.  
 
It might be argued that the practice of the Member States when it comes to the reporting 
to the CTC and implementing of Resolution 1373 proves a “clear and continued 
acceptance” of the regime established under Resolution 1373.363 However, the most 
important practice of the Member States is that relating to the implementation of 
Resolution 1540. This is not experiencing the same progress as the implementation of 
Resolution 1373, which might be an argument counter acceptance.  
 
 
5.4 Conclusions on subsequent practice and implementation 
 
In order for the Security Council to develop its competencies within the Charter of the 
United Nations through subsequent practice, both recurrence of acts of similar character 
and acceptance by the Member States of the United Nations.364 Resolutions 1373 and 
1540 are both resolutions containing norms of simultaneously binding, abstract and 
general character and Resolution 1540 for this reason represent a recurrence of 
Resolution 1373 for the matters of interest in the present paper.365
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The organs of the United Nations are in the first instance the judges of their own 
jurisdiction. However, such a determination will only be binding if this determination is 
followed by the Member States in general.366 This makes the practice of- and 
implementation in the Member States of great importance.367 This was promoted as well 
in the preparatory works of the Charter, in which the sub-committee of the Committee on 
Legal Questions at the San Francisco Conference stated: “It is to be understood (...) that 
if an interpretation made by any organ of the Organization (...) is not generally 
acceptable it will be without binding force”.368 The other way around this would 
arguably mean that an interpretation of an organ of the Organization, which is generally 
acceptable would be binding.369  
 
The implementation in the Member States is for this reason of determining character. 
When the Security Council interprets its own powers, as it has done with the notion 
‘threat to the peace’ and with regard to the measures it might take under Article 41, this 
interpretation is only binding if and when it is supported by state practice in general.370 
Without subsequent state practice, the interpretation of the powers of the organ by this 
itself is not binding on the Member States.371
 
As to the submitting of reports to the Counter Terrorism Committee, the reporting might 
bed described as initially successful, with submitting of reports from all states, including 
those one might not initially expect compliance from.372 On the other hand, the mere 
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filing of reports does not say anything on the real situation in the States. Furthermore, the 
most states are still – five years after the adoption of resolution 1373 – in their reports 
focused on the stages A and B.  
 
Arguably, Resolutions 1373 and 1540 serve as precedence for subsequent adoption of 
resolutions of simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents.373 This would imply 
as well that Resolution 1540 will not be the last resolution containing simultaneously 
binding, abstract and general norms the Council will adopt374 as well as a modification of 
the norms of the Charter of the United Nations.375  
 
It has been stated that Resolution 1540 is the "first major step towards having the 
Security Council legislate for the rest of the United Nations' membership",376 and that the 
Security Council would be “needed more and more to do that kind of legislative 
work”.377 Arguably, Resolution 1373 was an opening gate for at least further adoption of 
resolutions of simultaneously binding, abstract and general character by the Security 
Council.378 However, the Security Council is dependent on the support in the Member 
States to develop further its competences. This process might be described as a process of 
slow erosion, where one interpretation after another chip away the barrier on the way and 
slowly wear it away.379
                                                 
373
 Szasz, page 905; Aston, page 118 argues that they will be of precedent character for the decision-
making process of the Untied Nations.  
374
 Talmon, page 175. 
375
 Optimistically, Krisch, page 885, concludes that that the implementation of Resolution 1373 has 
“changed the world order”. 
376
 www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2004/pleugerpc.DOC.htm. 
377
 Ibid.  
378
 Szasz, page 905: "The members of the SC were most likely unaware, when they hastily adopted 
Resolution 1373, of the pioneering nature of that decision. Now that this door has been opened, however, it 
seems likely to constitute a precedent for further legislative activities." 
379
 Nolte, page 228; Stromseth, page 45: "Despite political differences and current difficulties, the last 
decade suggests that the Security Council will continue to find ways to innovate in response to threats to 
93 
 A final answer to the question would still be to come, revealed through the following 
subsequent practice by the Security Council and most important through the 
implementation and acceptance of this in the Member States. Their role for these to play 
in the future will be great when it comes to limiting and leading the practice and the 
powers of the Security Council in the wanted direction.380
 
                                                                                                                                                 
peace and security in the dangerous years ahead." 
380 See Nolte, page 325: "So far, the Council's assertion of its expanded powers has met with little 
determined resistance and much official approval. There are signs, however, that this trend may not 
continue. If this is the case, the community of states is not reduced to the role of the sorcerer's apprentice 
who lost control of what he had brought to life." 
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6 Conclusions 
6.1 Summary 
 
Resolutions 1373 of 2001 and 1540 of 2004 are Security Council Resolutions, which 
clearly separate themselves from previously adopted Security Council Resolutions 
through their simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents. Previously adopted 
Security Council Resolutions with widespread implications, like those establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, or those 
establishing intrusive embargos on particular states or entities are only of a binding and 
general character. Resolutions of both general and abstract character have been adopted 
in the past, however only on a non-binding basis.  
 
Taken the innovative character of the Resolutions, the question arises whether or not 
these resolutions are within the competencies endowed on the Security Council under the 
Charter. The question is whether or not the adoption of binding resolutions containing 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general measures are encompassed by Article 41 of 
the United Nations Charter, opening for measures short of armed force. A necessary 
prerequisite for this is a determination of a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39 of the 
Charter, and the question must be asked if the abstract dangers of international terrorism 
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction might be encompassed by this notion.  
 
From the lingual point of view, the notion ‘threat to the peace’ is arguably open when it 
comes to whether or not the Security Council might address abstract dangers as ‘threats 
to the peace’. The measures found in the Article itself are of fairly concrete nature, 
leading to an assumption that ‘threats to the peace’ must be of a somewhat concrete 
nature. However, the contents of the notion have developed over the years, to 
encompassing situations, which fundamentally threaten the peace. The notion ‘threat to 
95 
the peace’ remains open when it comes to whether or not it encompasses abstract 
phenomena.  
 
The adoption of resolutions containing simultaneously abstract, general and binding 
norms is not mentioned as a ‘measure short of armed force’ under Article 41 of the 
Charter. This list of measures found in Article 41 is though not an exhaustive one. The 
measures listed in the article are, however, all of a concrete character, suitable for 
responding to concrete situations. Resolutions of simultaneously binding, abstract and 
general character are of a different character than these measures, and Article 41 does not 
open for the adoption of such. This conclusion is supported by a systematic interpretation 
of the Charter emphasizing the distribution of competencies between the organs of the 
Organization as well as by the preparatory works of the Charter. An interim conclusion is 
therefore that the Security Council acted ultra vires as it adopted Resolutions 1373 and 
1540.  
 
However, the concept of implied powers could possibly expand the powers of the 
Security Council under the Charter to encompass the adoption of resolutions of 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents. There are different approaches to 
the subject, which are closely interconnected with the view one has on the Charter of the 
United Nations as a ‘constitution’ in the stronger sense of the notion. Arguably, the 
competencies of the Security Council would be wider in the instance that the Charter was 
a ‘constitution’ in the stronger sense of the notion. In this matter, no clear conclusion 
might be given. There are strong arguments in both directions, and the Charter of the 
United Nations clearly contains elements similar to those found in a national constitution, 
for example rudiments of a separation of powers. An interesting theory, which the present 
writer understands as a solution in between is the “living tree” theory, which implies a 
particularly vivid interpretation of the Charter.  
 
If one sponsors the conclusion that the Charter of the United Nations is not a 
‘constitution’ in the stronger sense of the notion, this would still imply a certain dynamic-
evolutionary interpretation of the Charter, that is: some powers would still be implied on 
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the Security Council without direct basis in the Charter text. These implied powers would 
though not be far- reaching enough to imply as well the adoption of resolutions 
containing simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms, as this would imply 
giving the Council materially far wider competencies than originally implied on it in the 
Charter.   
 
If one sponsors the conclusion that the Charter of the United Nations is in fact a 
‘constitution’ in the stronger sense of the notion, this would mean that the Security 
Council would have a larger degree of powers implied on it. This would possibly open 
for the adoption of resolutions of simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents. 
However, the consequences of such competencies are crucial for to which conclusion one 
arrives at here.  
 
The Security Council has over the years widened the field of what it determines a ‘threat 
to the peace’ or a potential such, which again broadens its possibilities to adopt measures 
under Chapter VII. The implications of competencies to adopt resolutions of 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents would be widespread and would 
seriously challenge the sovereignty of the Member States as well as it would disturb what 
existing distribution of competencies between the organs of the United Nations. This 
would be the main argumentation against implied powers for the Security Council to 
adopt Resolutions of simultaneously binding, abstract and general contents.  
 
The conclusion on the matter is of course open, depending on mainly which need one 
sees for such competencies by the Security Council as well as to which extent one sees 
the potential extension of the circle of phenomena as likely. The present writer holds the 
view that the Security Council is not in possession of the competencies to adopt 
resolutions containing simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms even after the 
implied powers rule and an understanding of the Charter as a ‘constitution’ in the 
stronger sense of the notion.  
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As the previous conclusions remain under debate, the subsequent practice and 
implementation must be discussed. It is clear, that even if the adoption of the Resolutions 
1373 and 1540 was ultra vires at the time of adoption, this could have healed through 
subsequent acceptance of the Resolutions and the legal basis for these. The Security 
Council has clearly and continuously regarded itself competent to adopt the Resolution 
1373 and 1540 as well as to address other phenomena as at least potential ‘threats to the 
peace’. Its persistence is particularly clear through the work of the Counter Terrorism 
Committee and that of the 1540 Committee. The subsequent practice of the Security 
Council is, however, substandard to that of the Member States.   
 
The Member States have arguably implemented the Resolution 1373 diligently. Large 
amounts of reports have been given, as well as the number of members to the different 
international instruments on the area of counter terrorism has increased drastically. This 
does, however, only give indications on the actual implementation in the Member States, 
as this would have to be found through an analysis of the internal legislation inn the 
individual states.  
 
As to the implementation of the Resolution 1540, the Member States initially proved 
sceptical to both to the resolution and to the powers of the Security Council to do so. 
After the adoption of the Resolution, however, the Member States have reported to the 
1540 Committee and has raised few critical voices.   
 
For the present writer, it remains difficult both to draw the conclusion that the Security 
Council was in the initial position to adopt Resolutions 1373 and 1540 from both clear 
and implied powers as well as to draw the conclusion that that the ultra vires character of 
the Resolutions have healed through subsequent practice and implementation. The 
conclusions, though, must said to be open. It will in the time to come be a great emphasis 
on the implementation by the Member States of Security Council Resolutions to come.  
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6.2 Law making contra law breaking 
 
The implications of the adoption of the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 will be discussed for 
two different angles: Firstly from the view that the adoption of the resolutions was ultra 
vires, secondly from the view that the adoption of the resolutions was intra vires or ultra 
vires and subsequently healed.  
 
Through the consideration of subsequent practice, the interpretation of the treaty and the 
alteration of the treaty are in the practice mixed, even if the notions might be clearly 
distinguished from each other in the theory.381 This makes an interpretation of the 
Charter based on subsequent practice of the Security Council and the General Assembly 
as well as the implementation in the Member States somewhat interesting. Arguably, law 
breaking is an essential part of law making.382  
 
 
6.2.1 The Resolutions were ultra vires 
 
If the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 were adopted ultra vires and were not healed by 
acceptance in the Member States, the question on what the consequences of such ultra 
vires acts by the Security Council were arises.  
 
There is of course no direct legislature on the international area endowed with powers to 
directly review acts of the Security Council. The Security Council is, at in the first stage, 
the judge of its own legality.  
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However, if the organs of the Security Council differ on the interpretation of their 
competences, an advisory opinion might be requested from the International Court of 
Justice.383 This could be of great importance when it comes to limiting the powers of the 
Security Council.384 The possibility for review of the powers at least in advisory opinion 
leads to a certain, but very limited control with the powers of the Council.385 On the other 
side, the International Court of Justice does not have the competencies to declare 
Resolutions of the Security Council “null and void”.386  Arguably, the rights of the 
Member States maintained in the Charter might in the present system be maintained only 
by persuasion or disobedience.387  
 
 
6.2.2 The Resolutions were intra vires or subsequently healed 
 
If the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 were adopted intra vires from the implied powers view 
or were adopted ultra vires and were subsequently healed by acceptance in the Member 
States, this could have implications for the competencies of the Security Council in the 
future.  
 
If the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are in fact adopted intra vires of the competencies the 
Security Council has got under the Charter of the United Nations, this would imply the 
Security Council has got the competencies to adopt resolutions of simultaneously 
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abstract, binding and general resolutions, powers, which are of potentially widespread 
impact.388  
 
On the other hand, if the Resolutions 1373 and 1540 were in fact adopted ultra vires of 
the competencies of the Security Council, and if this ultra vires character of the 
resolutions has in fact healed after subsequent practice in the Member States as 
determined through their implementation of the Resolutions, this would mean that the 
Member States has got a particularly important role to play in the development of 
international law in the time to come. The practice of the Security Council will only be an 
expression of a binding interpretation of the Charter if it is in fact supported by the 
Member States.389
 
It must of course be separated between the importance of the implementation of 
Resolution 1373 and the importance of the implementation of Resolution 1540. The 
former would be a prejudice for the latter. As the second instance of a resolution 
containing norms of abstract, general and binding norms, the Resolution 1540 could 
establish general powers to adopt resolutions containing binding, abstract and general 
norms if this is accepted by means of implementation in the Member States. In other 
words, if the Security Council has got general powers to adopt resolutions containing 
simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms is dependent on the Member States 
acceptance of Resolution 1540.390  
 
What is demanded from the subsequent practice of the Member States in order to create 
new rules binding for the future is difficult to say. Arguably, it must for the importance of 
subsequent practice be differentiated between accepting single instances of ultra vires 
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acts and creation of customary international law or reformation of the Charter.391 
However, in order to understand this, the motivation of the Member States must be taken 
into concern.392 The selfish interests in fighting the all-encompassing threats of 
international terrorism and of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state 
entities is an argument in direction that the Member States have accepted the ultra vires 
acts by the Security Council only for the individual cases, and that no general 
competencies to adopt resolutions containing simultaneously binding, abstract and 
general norms was intended confined on the Security Council.393  
 
 
6.2.3 Limitations to the potential powers of the Security Council 
 
It is clear that there in fact exist some limitations on the powers of the Security Council. 
This is clearly expressed in the Charter of the United Nations stating “the specific powers 
granted to the Security Council”. This was clearly promoted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Tadic Case: “The Charter thus speaks 
the language of specific powers, not of absolute fiat.”394 The powers of the Security 
Council are constrained both by the Charter itself 395 and by ius cogens norms.396  
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 Constraints of the Council deriving from the Charter itself are in the first degree that it 
must be kept within the limits of the purposes and principles of the Charter,397 but 
principles of justice and international law are not binding on the Security Council when it 
is acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.398  
 
The principle of proportionality is binding on the Security Council.399 This implies that 
there must be a reasonable connection between the phenomenon in question and the 
contents of the adopted resolutions.400 Such a principle would be in conformity with the 
object and the purposes of Article 39. The Security Council would violate the Charter 
provisions and act ultra vires if the impact of its resolutions on the Member States were 
manifestly out of proportion to the objective pursued.401 However, like the Council 
determines its competencies, it has got a wide margin of appreciation in determining the 
proportionality of its own action.402 Arguably, the more the Council the Council extends 
its functions under the Charter, the stronger the principle of proportionality should be 
                                                                                                                                                 
395
 UN-Charter, Art. 25: only decisions by the Council in accordance with the present Charter are binding; 
UN-Charter Art. 24 (2): The Council "shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the UN." 
Frowein/Krisch, page 710, margin number 25: Any discretionary powers of the Security Council must be 
derived from the Charter and may not be presumed. Talmon, page 182. Alvarez 2003, page 124: in 
particular must the Council act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.  
396
 Gowlland-Debbas 2004, page 65.  
397 Tadic Jurisdiction, paragraph 29. The Court states that the determination under Article 39 is a “more of 
a political concept” and continues “the determination that there exists such a threat is not a totally 
unfettered discretion, as it has to remain, at the very least, within the limits of the Purposes and Principles 
of the Charter. 
398
 Article 1 number 1 of the Charter. Frowein/Krisch page 710, margin number 26. 
399
 Rosand 2005, page 547. 
400
 Talmon, page 181: "... a reasonable connection between the phenomenon in question and the use of 
force is required in all cases." 
401
 Rosand, page 547. 
402
 Talmon, page 185; Frowein/Krisch, page 711, margin number 30. 
103 
regarded as a general limitation to the actions of the organs of the United Nations 
organization.403  
 
 
6.3 De lege ferenda 
 
Any powers of the Security Council to adopt Resolutions of simultaneously binding, 
abstract and general contents will clearly be of potentially great impact on the Member 
States, as illuminated above in Part 4.3.3. There are procedural deficits in the Security 
Council making such widespread competencies highly questionable. Resolutions are 
adopted non-democratic and non-transparent, and would be indefensible for any other 
reason than to provide the possibility to take effective measures in pressing or acute 
situations.404 The legitimacy of the Security Council is weak405 and it is suffering from 
democracy deficit. Such objections might of course be made to all decisions by the 
Security Council, but in the case of resolutions of simultaneously binding, abstract and 
general contents, the consequences of this are even clearer.  
 
On the other side, it might be argued that the Security Council is one of the few effective 
organs in public international law that really functions relatively efficient. For example, it 
is argued, the Security Council might respond rapidly to human rights crisis.406 
Furthermore, the Council has through its actions immensely contributed to the 
                                                 
403
 Kirgis, page 517. 
404
 See also Koskenniemi 1995 page 338: “That the five Great Powers have permanent membership and the 
right of veto in the Council and that the Council has the authority to bind members would be indefensible 
under any conception of institutional justice worthy of that name.” 
405
 Mere 15 Members, five non-selected, from which in the best case all 15 support a resolution, in the 
worst case only nine. Thereto the veto-problematic must be taken into concern.  
406
 Alvarez, War on Terrorism, 2003, page 123. 
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progressive development of international human rights.407 This might call for certain 
cautiousness in criticizing new developments by the Security Council.  
 
That the Security Council might contribute to further developments on the international 
human and humanitarian rights area through fully using the potential lying in the 
adoption of resolutions of simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms. It has 
through its mere addressing of different questions helped renew the interest in different 
vulnerable groups, such as women and children, civilians, refugees and the victims of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
 
Furthermore, the United Nations Organization has been described as the single most 
influential source of international legitimacy today.408 An effective counteraction to 
terrorism and other threats to the peace would arguably require a collective approach 
based on a platform of legitimacy that only the UN may provide.409  
 
Furthermore, a to broad scope of activities under Chapter VII, marginalizing the issues 
addressed by the Council on high politics and making the Council even more an 
instrument for the western powers could lead to threat the Security Council loose or 
weaken its authority.410 This would be damaging for the continuance of the work of the 
organ. It might be argued that the powers of the Council are only justifiable on the basis 
of its specific and limited purpose, that is, on the basis of its police function,411 and that 
the Council may only maintain its authority as long as it acts within only within the 
frames of this.412
  
                                                 
407
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408
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410
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With regards to procedures of the Council, representation and transparency, powers to 
adopt resolutions containing simultaneously binding, abstract and general norms are 
powers the Security Council are neither intended to possess nor from a de lege ferenda 
point of view suited to have.  
 
However, this concentration of powers in the Security Council has got its clear negative 
sides. In the Security Council, executive powers as well as the powers to adopt binding, 
abstract and general resolutions would be accumulated, with itself as the sole judge of the 
legality of its own actions.413 "The Security Council is constituted by executive 
representatives, operating in most cases without the apparatus of accountability to which 
most executives are subject under their own national systems. And yet it is, 
internationally, the megaphone of executives."414  
 
                                                 
413
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